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Jean Allain, Andrew Crane, Genevieve LeBaron and Laya Behbahani
This report demonstrates how businesses profit 
from forced labour. It considers the construction 
industry, the food sector and cannabis ‘grow-ops’ 
to demonstrate where and how their labour supply 
chains may be vulnerable to forced labour.
The United Kingdom is at the forefront in creating new responsibilities for 
businesses to ensure that their supply chains are free of forced labour. This 
report assists by examining vulnerabilities in hiring practices, social auditing 
and government policies. It maps how forced labour may find its way into 
legitimate supply chains.
The report demonstrates that: 
• the UK economy creates a pool of people vulnerable to forced labour;
• forced labour in the UK is not hidden;
• informality and the informal market are associated with forced labour;
• within construction, food and the cannabis industries, sector-specific 
conditions create the possibility of forced labour.
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executive summary
In spite of growing awareness of forced labour 
within the United Kingdom (UK), there remains a 
need for a better understanding of the business 
dynamics that surround and underpin forced labour. 
This report analyses the cost structures, forms of 
organisation, and revenue streams that facilitate 
forced labour, as well as the business pressures 
and processes that give rise to it. Focusing on 
the sectors of commercial cannabis cultivation, 
construction and food, this report develops a 
conceptual model of the business of forced labour 
to deepen our understanding of its modus operandi, 
expanding knowledge about how the use of forced 
labour allows businesses to turn a profit.
vulnerability to forced labour
• There are broad structural conditions that give rise to vulnerabilities that 
can be exploited. These include immigration status, and forms of labour 
market inequality and immobility rooted in the government’s light-touch 
regulation of business.
• Vulnerability to forced labour is not an inherent quality of the person 
subjected to it, but rather is rooted in structural vulnerabilities established 
within the UK economy. These result in denying effective protection of 
workers’ rights, particularly at the lower rungs of the labour market.
• There are also specific sector conditions that give rise to a context fertile 
for forced labour and exploitation. These include illegality of product 
(cannabis), volatility and self-regulation of labour providers (construction) 
and seasonality (food).
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business models of forced labour
• Forced labour will only be used when it makes business sense to do so.
• There are two broad types of businesses conducting forced labour: 
direct, private producers and intermediaries (e.g. labour agencies). These 
businesses will exhibit various degrees of informality.
• Businesses make money from forced labour in one of two main ways: 
either using it to minimise costs and/or to generate additional revenue.
• There are two main ways in which costs are reduced: minimising labour 
costs, and minimising risks.
• There are also two main ways in which revenue is generated: by charging 
for ancillary services and/or theft of benefits.
• These features give rise to four broad business models of forced labour: 
cost-minimising producer; revenue-generating producer; cost-minimising 
intermediary; and revenue-generating intermediary.
labour and product supply chains
• To understand the business dynamics at play, we also need to understand 
how these perpetrators are linked with other business actors through the 
supply chain.
• Understanding forced labour in the context of supply chains helps us map 
the relationships between relevant economic actors.
• Focusing on supply chains also assists in identifying where and how the 
formal business sector intersects with the informal sector, the locus of 
forced labour.
• Forced labour in the UK is almost always associated with some degree of 
informality, whether it is associated with producers or intermediaries, in 
product supply chains or in labour supply chains.
• The product and supply chains involved in forced labour in the UK 
illustrate the way in which informality becomes the gateway to forced 
labour.
combating the business of forced labour
• As awareness of forced labour in the UK has grown, various systems have 
been developed to combat the business of forced labour.
• The three most prominent interventions designed to identify or disrupt 
forced labour are regulatory enforcement, licensing of labour providers 
and social auditing.
• Our research suggests that these current approaches are limited in their 
effectiveness at preventing, detecting, and prosecuting forced labour.
conclusions and recommendations
• While it is often considered that forced labour is hidden, our research 
demonstrates that there are links to the formal economy through supply 
or labour chains.
• While product supply chains in the UK are relatively short, labour supply 
chains have a greater propensity to become complex. This complexity 
allows forced labour to thrive.
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• The complexity in labour supply chains is most evident in time-sensitive 
situations, such as agricultural harvest or looming construction deadlines.
• Recognising that our recommendations encompass possible trade-offs, 
and challenge freedoms normally associated with ‘doing business’, we 
recommend that:
 – the government take the lead in regulating forced labour out of 
the market by establishing a multi-stakeholder action plan (MSAP) 
and putting in place a UK-wide advisory panel to better coordinate 
activities, including the implementation of MSAP;
 – forced labour is disrupted by targeting interventions within both the 
formal and informal economies. Interventions should recognise that 
forced labour is not hidden, and that somewhere along the supply 
chain informality intersects with the formal economy;
 – the cost of recruiting vulnerable people into forced labour be priced 
out of the market. That the government put in place the legislation 
and support the mechanisms in place, which can eliminate the 
structural elements of the UK economy that allow for forced labour 
and labour exploitation;
 – the cost of work force flexibility be borne by the producers (such as 
farmers, factory owners and construction companies) who ultimately 
make use of flexible labour. Rates paid to labour providers by 
companies must include an accurate account of the costs within the 
formal economy of recruiting and retaining a flexible workforce;
 – intermediaries be held accountable for the introduction of sub-
contracted labour into supply chains where the costs of flexibility have 
been borne by producers. Intermediaries should include appropriate 
awareness raising and training of labour providers by companies, as 
well as incentives for compliance;
 – intermediaries in the supply chain of labour at or near the national 
minimum wage are regulated. The mandate of a Gangmasters 
Licensing Authority (GLA)-like regulator should thus be extended to 
other industries at risk, starting with construction;
 – regulatory oversight over audit firms is instituted; a professional body 
to ensure standards throughout the industry is established; and a 
widely accepted, publicly available professional code of conduct is 
developed;
 – social audit firms are required to share data on incidences of suspected 
exploitation or criminality with other interested parties, including 
other auditors, their clients and the police. A watch-list of high risk 
producers and labour market intermediaries should be established;
 – in cases of cannabis-growing operations, law enforcement agencies 
and prosecutors recognise that gardeners may be in situations of 
forced labour and thus treated in the first instances as victims.
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iNtroductioN
There continues to be a growing awareness within 
the United Kingdom (UK) that workers are being 
subjected to forced labour. This is made most 
evident by the criminalising of forced labour, by 
a number of recent studies that have identified 
forced labour in various sectors of the UK economy, 
and by the increasing number of people identified 
by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (the 
predecessor of current National Crime Agency) as 
potential victims of trafficking for labour exploitation 
(National Crime Agency, 2012, 2013). In spite of 
this growing awareness, there remains a need for a 
better understanding of the business dynamics that 
surround and underpin forced labour.
While a great deal of attention has rightly been paid to the experiences 
of victims of forced labour, and to the role and dynamics of the criminal 
justice system, very little thought has gone into considering the mechanisms 
of profitability of forced labour, or the way in which people actually make 
money from it. Addressing this gap, this Report analyses the cost structures, 
forms of organisation, and revenue streams that facilitate forced labour, as 
well as the business pressures and processes that give rise to it. The Report 
develops a conceptual model of the business of forced labour to deepen our 
understanding of its modus operandi, expanding our knowledge about how 
the use of forced labour allows businesses to make a profit.
The first successful prosecution of individuals for compelling forced labour 
under Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Connors and Ors v. 
R. (2013)) clearly demonstrates that an individual’s vulnerabilities may be 
taken advantage of when demanding work which is exploitative. Our findings 
suggest that such vulnerabilities are not inherent qualities of the person, but 
rather are rooted in structural vulnerabilities established within the UK 
economy. These have been taken advantage of so as to exploit workers and, 
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in some cases, to exact forced labour from them. Significantly, vulnerabilities 
to forced labour and exploitation are dynamic and result in denying effective 
protection of workers’ rights at the margins of the UK economy.
In particular, our study demonstrates that these structural vulnerabilities 
result from a UK economy which emphasises a light-touch, employer-
friendly regulatory framework in which to do business; the use of agency 
workers; varying employment status set by immigration policy; and sector 
specific attributes which create a precarious segment of the workforce that is 
open to exploitation and, more seriously, forced labour.
scope and approach
This consideration of forced labour from a business perspective takes 
place within the context of a number of studies commissioned by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) which have both provided evidence 
of forced labour in the UK and considered its underlying causes. Building 
on these studies, consideration turns to conceptualising, from a business 
perspective, how and why forced labour emerges and is sustained within 
UK based businesses. Although we have developed our analysis in relation 
to three industries – commercial cannabis grow-ops (growing operations), 
construction, and food – we see no reason why the business models included 
in this Report are not applicable in other contexts in the UK.
To develop and explain the relevant business approaches to forced 
labour, we present a framework for delineating the business models that 
enable different types of perpetrators to make money from forced labour. 
We then consider the relevant supply chains that feed into these business 
models. We distinguish between and document the intersections of two 
types of supply chains: those of products and labour. In the first instance, an 
understanding of product supply chains – i.e. the stages of economic activity 
that are involved in transforming raw material into finished goods – enable 
us to determine the amount of value that can be captured at any particular 
box 1: the connors case
Five members of the Connors family were convicted of conspiracy to 
require a person to perform forced or compulsory labour in December 
2012. The Connors family ran a business that involved paving, 
tarmacking, and roofing. The Court found that over a 20 year period, 
the Connors family travelled throughout England and Scotland and 
picked up men who were ’down and out’ – either homeless or addicted 
to alcohol or both – to work for them as labourers and moved them 
around the country. The workers were often enticed by the offer of free 
accommodation and food. The workers were paid as little as five pounds 
a day for hard labour, and were subjected to violent punishment and 
discipline. The judge observed that “the exploitation of vulnerable men 
through forced labour” had brought the family “rich financial rewards” 
including a Rolls Royce and many other luxury vehicles, and millions of 
pounds in property.
Source: Connors and Ors v. R. (2013)
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stage. In the second case, a specification of the labour supply chains helps 
us to understand the dynamics that enable exploitation and the capturing of 
value from workers, and minimise the threat of detection or disruption from 
outsiders.
In this way, this business perspective allows for the identification of 
fundamental features of forced labour to come to the fore, commonalities 
with regard to who might employ forced labour, how an organisation makes 
money from forced labour, and where, along the supply chains of production 
and labour, forced labour might emerge or become prevalent.
The findings were developed through research conducted on three 
economic sectors where forced labour had previously been identified. Thus 
the organisational structures of illegal, commercial cannabis grow-ops 
were considered against the backdrop of an exponential increase, between 
2007 and 2010, in the number of arrests and prosecutions of ‘growers’ in 
combination with claims of trafficking of Vietnamese children and adults 
who had been locked into urban houses and required to tend commercial 
cannabis plants.
Food processing and agriculture were examined in the light of a number 
of reports into exploitative practices and claims of forced labour which 
prompted the creation of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority so as to 
oversee standards in the farming, food processing and shellfish sectors.
Finally, the construction industry was selected as a result of a number 
of factors, including a growing awareness of exploitative practices; its being 
a sector that has developed a self-regulatory system and thus avoided 
governmental oversight; and the suggestion in previous reports that 
exploitative labour providers were seeking to migrate from other sectors, 
including food.
This first stage of the research involved sector specific secondary data 
collection and analysis and the development of a basic conceptual framework 
based on published sources, including court documents and cases, newspaper 
articles, academic studies, and business and governmental reports.
The second stage involved more than 30 stakeholder interviews 
conducted in March 2013 with those actively engaged in the issue of forced 
labour both generally and more specifically with regard to the commercial 
cannabis cultivation, construction, or food sectors. The collected data was 
in part analysed using NVivo (a qualitative data analysis software designed 
to examine large volumes of data), resulting in the development of our key 
frameworks and findings. These findings were then introduced and discussed 
at a round-table held at the JRF offices in London in April 2013, leading to a 
final round of refinement and revision. See Appendix A for a full description 
of the methodology and Appendix B for details of sources and participants in 
the research.
definitional issues
A number of terms utilised in this Report require some introductory remarks 
to provide clarity to the concepts and precision to the language used.
Forced labour
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 for the first time criminalised the 
compelling of forced labour in the UK. That Act notes that forced labour 
should be construed in accordance with the provisions relating to forced 
labour found in the European Human Rights Convention (see Section 72(2) 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/
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pdfs/ukpga_20090025_en.pdf). For its part, the European Court of Human 
Rights has used as its starting point for interpreting forced labour the 
definition established in the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO’s) 1930 
Forced Labour Convention:
All work or service which is exacted from any person under the 
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered 
himself voluntarily.
The European Court has only considered the issue of forced labour a handful 
of times, but has noted that such labour ’brings to mind the idea of physical 
or mental constraint’ (see Siliadin v. France (2005), para 117). In essence 
forced labour requires two elements, the first is that workers face the 
menace of a penalty and the second is that they have not offered themselves 
voluntarily for the work undertaken. The Court has said in the CN and V v. 
France (2013) that the notion of a penalty should be interpreted broadly 
to include the ’loss of rights and privileges’, but also in ’its most extreme 
form involves physical violence or restraint, or even death threats addressed 
to the victim or relatives’. Beyond this, the European Court notes that 
there ’can also be subtler forms of menace, sometimes of a psychological 
nature’, including ’threats to denounce victims to the police or immigration 
authorities’. Where the issue of voluntariness is concerned, the Court has 
had little to say, but for an evidentiary ascertaining as to whether consent 
was sought or given to the work undertaken.
In the UK context, the relatively short period of time since the coming 
into force of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 means that there remains a 
long arc of activity which might be criminalised under the heading of forced 
labour. This could stretch from an agricultural worker being threatened 
with redundancy for failing to accept less than the minimum wage all the 
way to a case of slave labour taking place against a backdrop of violence. 
The European Court provides guidance as to where to draw that line as 
to violations of its provisions, making reference to cases that would fail to 
meet the threshold of forced labour where the burden was not ’excessive or 
disproportionate to the advantages attached to the labour undertaken’ (Van 
der Mussele v. Belgium (1983)).
Beyond those elements specific to forced labour, the requirement for the 
UK to follow the lead of the European Court of Human Rights means that 
there are positive obligations on the Government to ensure that an effective 
system is in place to maintain the prohibition against forced labour (Siliadin 
v. France (2005); and Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010)). As a result, law 
enforcement agencies must investigate allegations and the Office of the 
Public Prosecutor must pursue cases where the evidence points to the use 
of forced labour (OOO and others v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
(2011)). Such positive obligations, however, go beyond the criminal justice 
system and require the UK to have legislation in place to effectively address 
situations of forced labour, be it through criminal, civil, or employment law.
Exploitation
The term ‘exploitation’ lacks a legal definition. However, it has gained 
currency as one of the three elements required to constitute the crime 
of trafficking in persons. The United Nations and European Conventions 
(United Nations, 2000; Council of Europe Convention, 2005) establish that 
trafficking is present where a person is moved, without their consent, ’for 
the purposes of exploitation’. These conventions do not define exploitation, 
instead they provide examples, such as forced labour, servitude, and slavery. 
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While exploitation should be understood as being categorical rather than 
definitional, it should be emphasised that the possible types of exploitation 
were set out in an open-ended manner which has allowed countries to 
introduce other activities under the banner of ‘exploitation’. In 2013, the 
UK became party to the EU Directive on trafficking that establishes that 
exploitation for the purpose of trafficking also includes begging and ’the 
exploitation of criminal activities’ (European Union Directive, 2011).
For the purposes of this Report, exploitation is understood as taking 
unfair advantage of another person in a work situation, where the element 
of ‘unfairness’ is established against a benchmark established in law (Allain, 
2013). Thus, a person will be exploited where they have been taken unfair 
advantage of by another person acting unlawfully – be it by reference to 
criminal, human rights or employment law – for example by deducting 
unlawful charges from a payslip or demanding hours of work in excess of 
what is legally prescribed. The reverse is also true, that an employer who is 
acting lawfully is not exploiting his or her employee. Where exploitation is 
concerned, there exists a continuum ranging from decent work to severe 
exploitation, characterised by distinctive forms and degrees of immobility, 
devaluation, and coercion (Skrivankova, 2010; LeBaron and Ayers 2013). 
Where exploitation in this grey area grows darker still is where it becomes, in 
law, forced labour.
Informality
It is in the grey area of informal work where forced labour can emerge. The 
line to be drawn between formal and informal work is the legal threshold. 
Formal employment requires respect for the ILO standards of decent 
work which have been translated into UK law, that is to say: workers’ rights 
touching on minimum wage, legal deductions, hours worked, and health and 
safety standards. Where a working relationship, be it direct or through an 
intermediary, circumvents employment law or other legal obligations, such as 
tax and immigration requirements, the work is deemed, for this Report, to be 
informal.
This informal working relationship should not be confused with the 
informal economy, as in numerous cases informal working relationships 
exist within the formal economy. A construction site may include not only 
full-time workers, but also part-time, and casual workers. Within the casual 
workforce, some workers may have a formal working relationship with a 
subcontractor, while others may find themselves in an informal working 
relationship, thus open to exploitation, or worse, forced labour.
Within the sectors considered for this Report, informal agents 
and informal labour are often present within the business models of 
forced labour. That said, it must be acknowledged, as Phillips notes, that 
employment in the informal sector ‘cannot be taken always and necessarily 
to be synonymous with an idea of ‘un-decent’ work and exploitative labour 
relations’ (Phillips, 2011). At the same time, it is important to recognise that 
not all informal agents or organisations are criminal, and not all criminal 
activity is conducted by informal agents or organisations. Thus, while there is 
a need to conceptualise informality as a crucial part of the ways that supply 
chains are organised and forced labour takes place, informal activity and 
agents should not be assumed always to be the rotten part of the supply 
chain.
While informality is a necessary condition for forced labour, much 
informality does not lead to forced labour. Similarly, forced labour always 
intersects somewhere with formality, but most formality is not associated 
with forced labour. The informal sector constitutes a significant part of the 
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UK economy of which, our research suggests, certain forms of informality 
are intentionally cultivated by businesses.
Regulatory framework
The UK’s regulatory framework should be understood in a rather expansive 
manner, as the rules of governance in place, manifest in both hard and/or 
soft law, which affect a given situation.
Thus, with regard to work, the UK regulatory framework includes UK 
employment law, but includes in any specific situations other forms of 
regulation, such as further legal obligations (immigration, European or 
international law – including human rights and international labour standards 
– whether or not they are incorporated into UK law), as well as the powers 
of regulatory agencies, and their standards and guidelines.
Furthermore, in this Report, the UK regulatory framework should be 
understood as denoting the governance of a situation in real terms, rather 
than those prescribed. In other words, the extent to which legal obligations 
and other standards are actually respected and enforced in the breach.
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1 coNtext of 
forced labour
Since 2009, JRF has undertaken a significant 
number of studies related to forced labour in the 
UK. These studies reveal that forced labour is not 
only the product of individuals taking advantage of 
the vulnerability of others so as to extract material 
gain, but that the underlying causes are the result 
of structural elements of the regulatory framework, 
which often create the very vulnerabilities that place 
people at risk of being victims of forced labour.
While the UK has a well-developed regulatory framework regarding 
employment, employment law historically exhibits the countervailing 
tendencies towards regulating in detail the activities of trade unions 
and employees, while limiting and reducing regulation and oversight of 
employers.
This limitation of employer oversight is most evident with regard to the 
lack of an overall system of workplace inspection. While the UK is formally 
party to the 1947 ILO Labour Inspection Convention (ILO, 1947), its 
undertakings do not reflect its spirit, as that instrument was meant to allow 
labour inspectors to play a much larger role in the oversight of conditions 
of employment such as hours, wages, and welfare of workers. Instead, 
the only general labour inspectorate in the UK is the Health and Safety 
Executive, which is limited to ensuring that health and safety standards are 
enforced in the workplace. Beyond this, the system meant to protect rights 
of workers has ’become increasingly complex and atomised’ wherein HMRC, 
the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Employment 
Agency Standards Inspectorate, and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority 
all have limited, sector and/or employment rights specific, mandates (Balch, 
2012).
The lack of commitment to enforcement within a UK regulatory 
framework can be seen with regard to the national minimum wage, where no 
prosecutions have taken place since June 2010 and, despite the introduction 
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of a policy from 1 January 2011 to ‘name and shame’ violators who 
disregard the minimum wage, only one person has been so named, a 
situation that the Low Pay Commission deems ’very disappointing’ (Low Pay 
Commission, 2013).
Issues of exploitation of workers result from vulnerabilities
People’s vulnerability is often a manifestation of larger societal issues, such 
as poverty, drug abuse or social exclusion. This is made plain in the only 
conviction to date on charges of forced labour under the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009, where the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales noted 
that the perpetrator in the Connors case had:
box 2: gangmasters licensing authority and the ‘red tape 
challenge’
While there have been calls for the Gangmasters Licensing Authority 
(GLA) type organisation to regulate intermediary or labour providers in 
all sectors of the economy, consultations in 2011 and 2013 regarding 
the mandate of the GLA are taking place as a result of the ‘Red Tape 
Challenge’, which seek to reduce regulation, as this makes ’it difficult for 
business to create new jobs’.
Among areas of focus, the Challenge specifically targets compliance and 
enforcement. The consultation is skewed toward deregulation. Beyond 
asking as a last alternative whether the inspections systems should be 
left as they are, the other alternatives emphasise less to no oversight 
over employment conditions. Thus, feedback is requested on the 
following basis:
These regulations relate to government’s direct enforcement 
of employment rights, including the national minimum wage, 
48 hour working week and employing agency workers… .
Tell us what you think should happen to these regulations and 
why, being specific where possible:
• Should we scrap them altogether?
• Could their purpose be achieved in a non-regulatory way 
(e.g. through a voluntary code?) How?
• Could they be reformed, simplified or merged? How?
• Can we reduce their bureaucracy through better 
implementation? How?
• Can we make their enforcement less burdensome? How?
• Should they be left as they are?
(www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/)
As a result of the Red Tape Challenge, GLA is poised to lose certain 
areas from the remit and the licensing system is meant to be improved 
’in a manner that reduces the costs and burdens for the applicants’ 
(DEFRA, 2013).
Our research indicates that the GLA is moving towards a ‘soft-touch’ 
enforcement regime with more emphasis on education rather than 
sanction.
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helped to persuade, cajole and bully vulnerable men to join 
their small work force … They were chosen deliberately. 
Usually they were homeless, addicted to alcohol, friendless 
and isolated, and for one reason or another, or more 
than one reason, effectively ‘down and out’ …
Connors and Ors v. R. (2013)
The Connors case relates to the type of vulnerabilities often seen in 
situations of exploitation and forced labour, yet our research indicates that 
the vulnerabilities which are taken advantage of most often are, in the main, 
the result of structural elements within the UK regulatory framework which 
create a precarious workforce that, in its darkest forms, allows for forced 
labour.
The precariousness of workers in the UK is most evident at or near 
the national minimum wage, and is rooted in market forces created by the 
dynamics of globalisation and a constant pressure to reduce production 
costs, which have reshaped the bottom rungs of the labour market (Lalani 
and Metcalf, 2012).
Globalisation
Globalisation, as it has impacted on the supply chains of both product and 
labour, has dramatically transformed international divisions of labour, and the 
nature and availability of employment in many countries. While globalisation 
has provided millions with decent work, unemployment and job insecurity 
at the lower end of the economy have also increased in many countries, 
resulting in working terms and conditions deteriorating for large swathes of 
the world population (ILO, 2009).
The creation of this structural labour market imbalance has meant that 
certain groups face high levels of exclusion from formal labour markets. 
Over one billion people – disproportionately women and people from 
ethnic minorities – are concentrated in informal labour market activities 
strongly correlated with the ’expansion of particular kinds of labour relations 
premised on enhancing the vulnerability, flexibility, and disposability of 
workers’ (Phillips, 2011). The ILO estimates that up to 75 per cent of 
employment in the global South is now informal, while up to 30 per cent 
of employment in the US and Europe is now ‘non-standard’ (ILO, 2002). 
Importantly, while globalisation has meant the removal of restrictions on 
the movement of capital and goods, the labour market mobility of large 
segments of the global population has been severely constricted (Dauvergne, 
2008; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009).
The expansion of informal labour, high levels of unemployment in many 
countries, and restrictions on access to labour markets in Europe and 
elsewhere have created a large and growing population lacking a viable and 
secure means of subsistence. These broad structural conditions give rise to 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited, creating a ready supply of workers that 
can be subjected to forced labour.
As Europe has increasingly restricted unskilled workers’ access to its 
labour markets – granting only relatively small numbers of unskilled workers 
temporary access through foreign migrant work programmes – many have 
attempted to migrate through irregular channels and ended up vulnerable 
to being trafficked and exploited through debt bondage or forced labour. 
Others, including a large number of the cases covered by our study, enter 
and work in the UK legally, but either are made to believe they are illegal 
by their employer, or become vulnerable due to restrictions placed on their 
right to work. That vulnerability is compounded by issues of language, social 
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exclusion and isolation, and cultural differences, which often accompany 
migrant labour.
Poverty, unemployment, and restrictions on access to remunerative 
labour markets combine to create systemic vulnerability to labour 
exploitation among certain sectors of the population. As one of our 
informants, David Arkless of Manpower Group stated, the “under-class 
that we have inadvertently developed through globalisation and the global 
economy, and acerbated by the recession, is an ideal target market for illegal 
use of labour, the illegal movement of labour, the trafficking of people”.
Beyond the overarching dynamics caused by globalisation, two structural 
elements of the UK regulatory framework have created a space in which 
individuals can be exploited in the workplace and become susceptible to 
forced labour. These are immigration policies and the growth of labour 
market intermediaries, particularly labour providers. It has been noted that:
The UK labour market has been trumpeted by some as the ‘free-est 
in Europe’ with job creation facilitated by immigration policies and the 
largest temporary agency sector in Europe. However, as the work of 
the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and others has shown, groups 
vulnerable to exploitation in the UK labour market, and therefore at 
risk of forced labour, are often immigrants and/or agency workers. 
Evidence suggests that these groups are often over-represented in 
economic sectors characterised by poor working conditions and a 
lower level of protection in terms of employment rights
Balch, 2012
Migrant workers status
A fundamental gap in the regulatory framework emerges from immigration 
policy which creates structural vulnerabilities. That is to say, that the 
governance of immigration in the UK is such that the various laws which are 
in place and the manner in which they are enforced create a precariousness 
for those following many of the different routes of migration into the UK. 
These vulnerabilities can then be taken advantage of to exploit a working 
relationship. Such structural vulnerabilities created by immigration policy, 
such as restrictions on work or access to benefits, establish a pool of 
workers often destined for the informal sector as a result of government 
policy which restricts or excludes them from playing an active and full role 
in society. The situation of migrant workers in the UK is governed by their 
immigration status, which allows free movement of EU workers, while, for 
instance, ’simultaneously promoting the destitution’ of asylum seekers and 
others by removing their right to work (Dwyer et al., 2011). Beyond those 
seeking refugee status and asylum, further examples of immigration policies 
which create structural vulnerabilities are those which have been applied 
to nationals of Central and Eastern Europe during the various waves of EU 
accession, and with regard to seasonal agricultural workers.
For nationals of Eastern and Central European States whose countries 
joined the European Union, transitional provisions were established 
wherein the UK limited access to public welfare. It is clear that during these 
transition phases – the first having ended in April 2011, the second, related 
to Bulgarians and Romanians, ended in December 2013 – these nationals 
were the main targets of exploitative practices. The vulnerability caused by 
the registration system imposed on nationals from these accession countries 
include the requirements to be bound to one employer for a year, and to 
hand over documents for registration; and the inability to access welfare if 
there was a failure to register, to stay with the same employer for 12 months 
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as a result of unemployment, or if there was a change of employer (Dwyer 
et al., 2011).
With regard to foreign agricultural workers, the Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers Scheme (SAWS) creates a structural vulnerability by tying 
workers to one employer. The SAWS workers are open to the possibility of 
exploitation at the hands of an unscrupulous employer, as their only recourse 
in cases of employer abuse is, in leaving employment, to leave the UK, as 
being illegal.
The context in which structural vulnerabilities associated with immigration 
status transpire must be understood in the light of the limited obligations 
which the UK has undertaken, as it has forgone the possibility of becoming 
party to treaties that would protect the rights of foreign workers such as the 
1975 ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, the 1990 
UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers, the 
1996 revised European Social Charter and the 2011 ILO Domestic Workers 
Convention. The structural vulnerability of foreign workers in the UK was 
made most evident by the 2011 conclusions of the European Committee of 
Social Rights. The Committee found that the UK was not in conformity with 
its rather limited obligations under the now dated 1961 European Social 
Charter in extending protection and assistance to foreign workers with 
regard to ’remuneration and other employment and working conditions’ in 
the same manner applicable to UK nationals (European Committee of Social 
Rights, 2011). For its part, a 2011 JRF Report concluded that immigration 
policy ’plays a key role in increasing the vulnerability of migrants to forced 
labour when their basic rights are compromised or nonexistent’ (Dwyer et al., 
2011).
Labour market intermediaries
A further element of the UK regulatory framework which creates structural 
vulnerability is related to the light-touch regulation of business which has 
encouraged the growth of third party labour providers. The UK has the 
largest agency sector in the EU (Gallagher and O’Leary, 2007), with more 
than double the number of agency workers compared with the second 















Proportion of the workforce in temporary agency work
Source: Arrowsmith (2006)
figure 1: proportion of workforce in temporary agency work in selected 
eu countries
18Forced labour’s business models and supply chains
largest market. The UK agency sector is also one of the most fragmented, 
’with a significant proportion of small, local operators … supplying mainly 
low-status workers as well as a few international operators supplying both 
high- and low-status workers’ (Balch and Scott, 2011).
The growth of agencies has been driven by the wish of producers to 
increase flexibility and reduce their labour costs. The use of agencies lowers 
labour costs by allowing producers to pay only hourly rates for workers and, 
in so doing, reduces their obligation to pay other costs normally associated 
with the standard employment relationship, such as pension and national 
insurance contributions. Neal Evans from the trade union Unite described the 
appeal of labour agencies for large-scale construction contractors:
First of all because their workflow will fluctuate, and second, 
because there is an add-on cost in terms of tax and national 
insurance contributions, which the employer can get around by 
approaching an agency and asking the agency, on a particular 
project, to supply fifty electricians or twenty scaffolders, or 
whatever the occupation is. Then they will pay the agency a 
fixed hourly rate for the worker, which may be more or less than 
what the collective agreement stipulates, but it is still cheaper 
for the contractor because they do not have the pension cost, 
the national insurance, tax, and all the costs that go along with 
employing people directly.
As noted in this Report, the uneven power relations between producers 
and smaller labour agencies is a key factor in shaping agency workers’ 
vulnerability. Labour market intermediaries have faced a challenging 
economic environment during the recession, seeing revenue decline annually 
in the past five years (IBISWorld, 2012). So in situations where, for instance, 
large producers are placing continuous pressure on intermediaries by 
tendering contracts at or near the national minimum wage, this means that 
intermediaries are being placed in a position where they must exploit their 
workforce if they are to make a profit. In such cases, some ’agencies have 
then used unfair deduction schemes for accommodation and transport to 
reduce costs further while the most unscrupulous will hold their workers in 
situations of forced labour’ (Lalani and Metcalf, 2012).
Where low-skilled work is required in time sensitive situations or in 
volatile industries, the need for additional workers generally means that 
labour agencies will fill the gap. Where there is high demand for labour 
within a short period of time, the labour supply chain will be extended, with 
subcontracting being the norm. Within this context, where intermediaries 
are charging costs for their services, when the amount of subcontracting 
creates a deeper labour supply chain beyond the knowledge of the principal 
contractor, the risks of exploitation escalate. Thus, the use of employment 
finder fees, zero hour contracts, excessive productivity targets, compulsory 
overtime, work on demand, payment of less than minimum wages, and bogus 
deductions have all been part of the landscape of exploitation at the hands 
of intermediaries (Kagan et al., 2011; Lalani and Metcalf, 2012; Scott et al., 
2012).
The UK regulatory framework – the space in which working relationships 
are forged – has evolved so as to prescribe a limited number of rights to 
workers. These have then been circumscribed so as to apply rather narrowly. 
The result is the creation of a number of structural vulnerabilities which place 
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workers in a precarious position, open to exploitation and even forced labour. 
These structural vulnerabilities, not inherent in the individual but created by 
the UK regulatory framework, allow, for instance, for university graduates to 
find themselves in a situation of forced labour, not because they are ‘down 
and out’, but simply because they are migrant workers with limited rights to 
work in the UK. When these structural vulnerabilities are then mapped onto 
issues of gender, race, ethnicity, language, and lack of familiarity with life in 
the UK or its employment framework, they further loosen the safety net that 
would ordinarily protect individuals from exploitation.
sector specific vulnerabilities
In addition to these broad structural conditions, there are conditions specific 
to those areas under consideration that give rise to a context fertile for 
exploitation and forced labour.
box 3: low pay commission – zero hours contracts
The term ‘zero hours contract’ does not have a statutory definition. It 
refers to an arrangement where the worker’s contract does not specify 
hours that they are required to work, but – within parameters which 
may vary according to the contract – they must be ready to work when 
asked by the employer.
Our sense from visits around the UK, from oral evidence sessions and 
from comment in the media was that there was increasing use of zero 
hours contracts. This was supported by official data which showed that 
from the end of 2007 to the end of 2011 the total number of workers 
on zero hours contracts increased by 10.8 per cent across the whole 
economy to 152,000. In the low-paying sectors the number of workers 
on zero hours contracts rose by 38.4 per cent, driven by large increases 
in hospitality, social care and leisure.
Workers expressed concerns to us that uncertainty about income and 
time commitments made it difficult to budget or to arrange childcare. 
It also made for difficulty in committing to any other employment. We 
heard on our visits how zero hours contracts can cause severe problems 
for workers who are also entitled to benefits, given the unpredictability 
of hours and income and the risk that benefits calculations will be based 
on over-optimistic assumptions about average income.
Employers told us that zero hours contracts were an important and 
necessary tool for some sorts of employer, and that some workers 
valued their flexibility.
Low Pay Commission (2013) National Minimum Wage. www.lowpay.
gov.uk/lowpay/report/pdf/9305-BIS-Low_Pay-Accessible6.pdf
For its part, the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
made international news in August when it reported that the research 
it had carried out suggested that “there could be more than a million 
zero hour workers in the UK” (Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development, 2013).
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The food sector
Dominated by a handful of global food retailers and their large suppliers, 
the food industry provides insights into how the business of forced labour 
operates in a highly concentrated industry. Furthermore, as labour provision 
within the agricultural sector has been licensed by the Gangmasters 
Licensing Authority (GLA) since 2006, a study of the food industry also 
provides crucial insights into how forced labour functions differently among 
legal and illegal labour providers, as well as shedding light on the roles of 
permanent and temporary informal organisations and agents.
The UK food industry was worth over £96.1 billion in 2011, and 
consumers in the UK spent over £179 billion on food, drink and catering 
that year (DEFRA, 2012: 16). The UK’s largest food retailers – Tesco, Asda, 
Sainsbury’s and Morrisons – commanded over 75 per cent of market share 
in 2012, and the food supply chain is made up primarily of large suppliers, 
including in food manufacturing and agriculture. However, there were also 
approximately 2,260 small and medium sized enterprises in the food chain 
in 2012, accounting for about 100,000 employees, and various studies have 
documented hyper-competition among smaller producers. Some studies, 
such as a 2010 Equality and Human Rights Commission investigation of 
the meat processing sector, have argued that smaller producers in the food 
industry sometimes face ’a stark choice between trading as ethically as they 
wished and obtaining contracts’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
2010, p 31).
With over 3.7 million workers, the food industry employed over 13 per 
cent of the UK workforce in 2012. Over 50 per cent of food sector jobs 
are part-time, and low-wage migrant work is increasingly common (DEFRA, 
2012; Scott et al., 2012). Employment in agriculture is especially precarious, 
with seasonal, casual or gang labour representing almost 40 per cent of total 
workers employed by farmers (DEFRA, 2012). This precariousness is related 
to time sensitivity of a number of food commodities – particularly fresh 
produce – as well as the seasonal nature of agriculture.
These dynamics drive firms’ choice for labour flexibility. The UK has 
attempted to address this need in part through SAWS, which allows ’farmers 
and growers in the UK to recruit low-skilled overseas workers to do short-
term agricultural work’ (United Kingdom Border Agency, 2013). Over 20,000 
Bulgarian or Romanian SAWS workers have been admitted into the UK and 
are provided accommodation by the farmer or grower who employs them 
(United Kingdom Border Agency, 2013).
table 1: food sector at a glance
Value • Agri-food sector contributed £96.1 billion in 2011
• 7.3% of total UK Gross Value Added (GVA)
Workers • 3.7 million workers in food production in 2012 
• 400,000 in food and drink manufacturing, 15% of overall manufacturing 
workforce
• 50% of jobs are part-time
Firms • Four food retailers – Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s, and Morrisons – control 
over 75% of market share
• Over 1,200 GLA licensed labour providers
Stability • Manufacturing is relatively stable: food is the least volatile of UK’s 
manufacturing industries
• Agriculture is much more volatile: beyond natural phenomena, farm 
profitability is dependent on global food prices
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Employers have also achieved labour flexibility through the use of labour 
providers. As of December 2012, the GLA had given out 1,147 full licences 
to labour providers and revoked 14. In the face of budget cuts, inspections 
have significantly declined recently (GLA, 2012), but in comparison to the 
majority of industries where agencies are not regulated, labour provision in 
the food industry is formalised, but with limited traceability.
The construction sector
Comprised largely of small firms and with labour supply chains characterised 
by flexibility and some degree of informality, the construction sector provides 
insights into how the business of forced labour operates when high numbers 
of subcontractors are involved. Over 50 per cent of the construction 
industry’s 250,000 firms have just one employee, 80 per cent have 1–3 
employees, and more than 90 per cent are micro firms employing fewer than 
10 workers (Office of National Statistics, 2011).
With over 2 million workers, the construction industry currently employs 
6.4 per cent of the UK workforce, approximately 40 per cent of whom are 
part-time (Maer, 2012). The industry is highly volatile – output fell much 
faster than GDP during the recession and has risen considerably faster in 
the upturn (Maer, 2012). This volatility has led to a long-standing reliance on 
contingent forms of labour such as self-employment, agency working and 
subcontracting (MacKenzie et al., 2010).
The sector’s small businesses typically face pressure to reduce labour 
costs, particularly in the light of market volatility and economic downturn, 
which means that employment tends to be precarious and insecure 
(Fitzgerald, 2010). There is evidence to suggest that the practice of false or 
‘bogus’ self-employment is commonly used by employers to ’evade taxes 
and engage workers without having to respect employment rights and 
entitlements such as holiday pay, sick pay, and pensions’ (UCATT, 2012). The 
Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians estimates that ’over 
50 per cent of those working in the industry are falsely self-employed’ due 
to misuse of the Construction Industry Scheme by employers and payroll 
companies. Migrant workers within the construction industry are largely from 
European accession countries (Balch and Scott, 2011).
As with the food industry, labour providers play an important role in the 
supply of workers to firms. Agencies have been used in the UK construction 
industry since the 1960s, predating most other industries. Growth in agency 
labour has continued apace since this time, largely to enhance flexibility but 
also increasingly to reduce costs (Forde et al., 2008). However, because the 
table 2: construction sector at a glance
Value • £89.5 billion in 2011
• 6.7% of total UK Gross Value Added (GVA)
Workers • Over 2 million construction workers in 2012
• As many as 400,000 bogus self-employed workers (large numbers from 
the A8* countries)
Firms • 250,000 firms in 2012
• 90% employ fewer than 10 workers
• Labour providers are fragmented, informal, and unregulated by GLA
Stability • Highly volatile: fell faster than GDP during recession, rose faster in the 
upturn
* The original eight Eastern and Central European countries which accede the European Union.
Note: The sector has a history of day labour, cash-in-hand payment, and tax avoidance.
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GLA’s remit does not extend to the construction industry, labour provision in 
this sector tends to be left to self-regulation.
Commercial cannabis cultivation
Commercial cannabis is classified as a Class B drug, and is the most widely 
used illegal drug in the UK. Historically an imported commodity, the 
Association of Chief Police Officers reports an increase in the number of 
cannabis grow-ops detected at 7,865 in 2012 compared to 3,032 in 2008 
(Association of Chief Police Officers, 2012, p 2). The UK is now an exporting 
nation of cannabis.
The minimum threshold for grow-ops considered to be ‘commercial 
cultivation’ is 25 plants. A crop can typically be harvested every 11–13 
weeks, allowing up to 4 crops per annum. Sites chosen for cultivation have 
in the past shifted from residential to commercial and industrial property and 
back again. The purchase of seeds and equipment from legally established 
local hydroponics (i.e. soilless, water-based, plant growing) businesses is 
deemed to be on the increase (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2012).
Of the large Vietnamese and Chinese populations living in the UK, a 
relatively small proportion of those who are involved in organised criminal 
groups (OCGs) are believed to be dominating commercial cannabis 
cultivation in the UK (EUROPOL, 2012; interview with Stephen Holme). 
These groups, while maintaining cannabis grow-ops, are also involved in 
legitimate commercial businesses, such as nail bars or restaurants, using 
these sites to launder the proceeds from their harvests. It is not unusual to 
see these OCGs that operate the cannabis grow-ops also being responsible 
for the smuggling of children and adults into the UK, using the journey 
to condition the growers for their role, while creating a situation of debt 
bondage. The debt is a result of the amount paid to be smuggled, and the 
bondage often results in compliance brought on by threats made against 
family members of the victim.
Forced labour in cannabis grow-ops appears to transpire with regard to 
Vietnamese children and adults who are smuggled into the UK, but then 
find themselves exploited as so-called ‘gardeners’ in commercial cannabis 
grow-ops. Police have discovered that when cannabis grow-ops are detected, 
they find the gardeners locked into the flats, where they have been provided 
with a bed and food and some form of entertainment such as a television or 
a laptop.
table 3: commercial cannabis at a glance
Value • Street price of £134 per ounce
• Estimated value of £207,368,447 seized in 2011/12
• Market estimated to be worth £1 billion a year
Workers • Often illegal migrants
• Growers of Vietnamese origin subjected to exploitation
• Adult victims originally smuggled but may end up as victims of trafficking
• Child victims typically trafficked by family members into debt bondage
Firms • 7,865 commercial cannabis cultivations disrupted in 2011/2012
• Organised Criminal Groups (OCGs) of Vietnamese and more recently, 
Chinese descent 
• Contracted foremen, site-procurers, electricians, debt enforcers and 
packagers/producers on monthly or commissioned wages
Stability • Approximately 270 tonnes of cannabis is needed to satisfy UK users 
annually 
• Industry has grown rapidly in recent years; the UK is now a cannabis 
exporter
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Law enforcement agencies in some parts of England have begun to see 
gardeners with limited mobility, where a single gardener is responsible for 
the maintenance of multiple sites of cannabis cultivation. They reported that 
the gardeners were travelling from one operation to another, all within close 
proximity, returning to their quarters at sunrise so as to avoid detection by 
the police. When police disrupt the cultivation and the gardeners are taken 
into custody, police find that they are scripted (to the extent that post-it 
notes were found telling the gardener verbatim what to say to the police) by 
the OCG to prevent any information leading to their own identification.
The fear instilled in the gardeners and the conditioning that their OCGs 
use to keep them under their control, combined with their illegal status in 
the UK, language barriers, and poor past experience with law enforcement 
in their home countries which prevents possible approaches to authorities, 
create the conditions for exploitation, while the OCGs remain, for their part, 
undetected (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2012). As a response to 
the absence of attention given to trafficking in people specifically for the 
purposes of criminal activities however, a 2013 directive from the European 
Parliament and Council amended the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 
2008, entitled the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Bill 2013. 
In the latest amendment, the directive provides for the criminalisation of 
two additional forms of exploitation not covered by existing legislation 
(i.e. trafficking for the purposes of forced begging and trafficking for 
criminal activities). The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 already 
criminalises human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation 
(including subjecting a person to forced labour) and exploitation for the 
removal of human organs. The new Bill expands the definition of human 
trafficking to ensure that people are not exploited for the purposes of forced 
begging and trafficking for criminal activities. Despite these efforts however, 
according to EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, no more than 5 out 
of 27 Member States of the EU have implemented the new and stronger 
EU legal framework for addressing trafficking in human beings (European 
Commission, 2013).
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2 busiNess models 
of forced labour
In this section we consider the use of forced labour 
in the context of its underlying business models 
– namely, who looks to make money from forced 
labour and how. Identifying these business models 
is important as it helps us to see forced labour from 
the perspective of the perpetrator as an economic 
actor. That is, we can examine the business rationale 
for forced labour in terms of how it helps to increase 
revenues or reduce costs for particular types of 
organisations. As will be demonstrated, there is 
no ‘one size fits all’ model of forced labour in the 
UK. Different enterprises use different means for 
different economic reasons. That said, we are only 
concerned here with this economic rationality, not 
with the ethical decision a person or firm may make 
when using forced labour. This is a no less important 
question, but one which is outside the scope of our 
analysis.
what is a business model?
A business model ’describes the rationale of how an organisation creates, 
delivers, and captures value’ (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). That is, it 
concerns the specification of the relevant organisational resources, revenue 
streams and cost structures that give rise to profitability. Put simply,
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a good business model answers … the fundamental questions every 
manager must ask: How do we make money in this business? What is 
the underlying economic logic that explains how we can deliver value 
to customers at an appropriate cost?
Magretta, 2002
In many organisations, the business model is quite simple: you make a 
product or provide a service in such a way that the revenues gained are 
greater than the costs of production. However, in recent decades, business 
models have become more complicated as firms have sought to deliver and 
capture value in different ways:
changing activities: Many firms have realised that some parts of their 
business are more valuable than others and so have developed new 
business models by outsourcing lower value-adding activities (such as 
manufacturing) to third parties and focusing only on higher value-adding 
activities (such as design and marketing). This is particularly evident in 
the fashion and sporting goods industries, where companies like Gap and 
Nike no longer operate a business model oriented around manufacturing 
(which is seen primarily as a cost to minimise) but instead focus more on 
branding and advertising.
changing products: Some firms do not look to generate revenue 
through their traditional ‘core’ products but through ‘ancillary’ products 
and services that are more profitable to produce and which can be 
bundled with or sold alongside the core product. Such firms may even 
give away the core product or offer it at below cost to encourage the sale 
of ancillary products. This approach can be seen among razor companies 
(which make money from razor blades not razors), banks (which make 
money from everything except current accounts), low-cost airlines (most 
notably Ryanair which offers a vast array of ancillary services including 
insurance, gambling, and food service), and many others.
changing customers: Various IT companies, such as Google and 
Facebook, do not charge for their services to end consumers. Instead 
revenue is generated through advertising and analytics services provided 
to other businesses. It is these businesses that are the real ‘customers’ in 
the business model of IT companies, even though they still have to focus 
on satisfying the non-paying varieties of customers.
changing costs and revenue streams: Free newspapers such as Metro 
operate a business model distinct from conventional newspapers in that 
their revenue is generated from advertisers not from end consumers, and 
they largely repackage existing news rather than produce new journalism. 
Hence their business models emphasise very different cost structures and 
depend on distinct streams of revenue.
In any given industry there may be a variety of business models that could be 
adopted, depending on the industry structure and the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of competitors. New business models also might emerge over 
time.
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applying business models to forced labour
How does the idea of a business model relate to the practice of forced 
labour? The key point here is that forced labour is only used when it 
makes business sense. This is not to say that forced labour is always used 
just because it makes business sense (in fact, most of the time individuals 
and firms are likely to seek to remain within the law), but that where it is 
used, forced labour has to fit into a business model that is profitable for 
the organisation concerned, given the revenues generated and the costs 
involved. These costs include those of recruiting and retaining workers, and 
enforcement and concealment of forced labour, and risks such as those of 
exposure and arrest.
So how do we understand these business models? In our view, there are 
three key issues to consider:
• Who employs forced labourers – is it organisations directly involved in 
primary activities (for example agriculture, processing and construction) 
or intermediary organisations providing labour for these organisations?
• How do organisations make money from forced labour – what is its 
impact on costs and revenue?
• What business models do these arrangements give rise to?
who employs forced labour?
There is considerable variety in the organisations perpetrating forced labour 
in the UK. Many existing accounts of forced labour do not seek to make any 
clear distinctions between these different types of perpetrators. However, a 
useful way of categorising these organisations from a business perspective is 
to identify whether they are producers directly involved in the production of 
goods or services or intermediaries operating in the specific sector of labour 
provision.
Producers
A producer is engaged in the production of a specific product and provides 
direct employment to workers in this activity. The producer creates value 
by transforming a product from one state to another in such a way that it 
becomes more valuable to a buyer. A producer using forced labour could 
be active in a wide range of potential business sectors, although evidence 
suggests that forced labour is most commonly associated with labour 
intensive, poorly mechanised activities, requiring a low-skilled labour force. 
In the UK, producers using forced labour are likely to be small enterprises 
(typically employing fewer than ten workers), operating in the informal or 
illegal sector. They may also be subcontractors to other primary producers, 
or sub-subcontractors, as is typically found in the construction industry. 
Forced labour by producers has been documented in all three of the sectors 
considered in this Report.
Intermediaries
Another set of organisations that perpetrate forced labour in the UK are 
labour market intermediaries. These individuals or organisations ’mediate 
between individual workers and the organisations that need work done, 
shaping how workers are matched to organisations, how tasks are performed, 
and how conflicts are resolved’ (Bonet, Cappelli, and Hamori, 2013). So 
intermediaries are not directly engaged in production, but provide labour 
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and labour-related services to producers. Examples of intermediaries are 
temporary agencies, recruitment agencies, labour providers, gangmasters, 
and payroll companies.
Intermediaries create value by conducting activities such as finding, 
selecting, hiring, deploying, training, firing, or administering workers for 
producers more efficiently or effectively than they could achieve themselves. 
That is, they either save producers money, or offer additional value, for 
example by providing them with a flexible workforce, training workers, or 
taking care of (and sometimes avoiding) labour standards.
Intermediaries are used to varying degrees in all three of the sectors 
studied in this Report. Their use has significant implications for how we think 
about the workplace and the employment relationship. Intermediaries are 
associated with a shift from a dyadic employment relationship between 
employer and worker to a triangular relationship where employer 
responsibilities may be shared (Vosko, 1997). This is shown in Figure 2. In the 
context of forced labour, this makes it difficult to allocate responsibility for 
perpetrating the offence. However, when we talk about models where the 
intermediary perpetrates forced labour, we are specifically concerned with 
situations where the intermediary rather than the producer has primary 
responsibility for the terms and conditions of employment of the worker.
making money from forced labour
Perpetrators make money from forced labour in the UK in one of two main 
manners – using forced labour either to minimise costs and/or to generate 
additional revenue.
Minimising costs
The most obvious way in which enterprises make money from forced labour 




b) Triangular employment relationship
producer worker
a) Dyadic employment relationship
figure 2: from a dyadic to a triangular employment relationship
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minimising labour costs: The reduction of labour costs to their minimum 
level is a key business driver for forced labour. This is not to suggest that 
the deployment of forced labour is ‘free’ for any enterprise in the UK, 
in that workers usually have some remuneration (although below the 
legal minimum), and employers incur other costs of deployment such as 
accommodation and subsistence (if these are not charged to the worker), 
as well as the costs of recruiting and retaining the workers (‘retaining’ 
here might involve the costs of violence or coercion). However, if the 
total cost of the worker to the employer using coercion (after these 
additional expenses have been accounted for) is below the rate that would 
otherwise be possible through a free arrangement, there is a rational 
business incentive to use forced labour. At times, this means that forced 
labour perpetrators can reap considerable rewards, although our evidence 
suggests that some perpetrators may also be using extreme exploitation 
as the only way to make even relatively small profits in a low margin 
business.
minimising risks: Forced labour can also make business sense where it 
helps to reduce risks for perpetrators. That is, employers that have control 
over workers through forced labour can leverage this control to reduce 
the risks of detection of their informal or illegal practices. This is partly 
because forced labourers, unlike free workers, are less likely to inform on 
the shady practices of their employers. Forced workers, as we discussed 
earlier, experience considerable vulnerability and this vulnerability often 
prevents workers from contacting authorities out of fear of reprisal, loss 
of work, further precariousness, or even deportation.
Revenue generation
Forced labour is not just about reducing costs. Many perpetrators in addition 
to, or instead of, deriving a benefit from cost reductions use forced labour 
to generate additional revenue. There are two main ways in which this can 
happen:
ancillary services: Many forced labour operators take advantage of their 
control over workers to turn them into captive ‘customers’ for a range of 
ancillary services. These services might vary, but the most common are 
accommodation, food, local and international transport, and immigration 
services. Although the provision of such services might also be a feature 
of free labour relationships, in a forced labour context, workers typically 
have little option but to pay for these services and often do not even 
know whether or how much they have been charged. As such, employers 
effectively acquire a monopolistic position in supplying ancillary services 
and so they can charge exorbitant prices far in excess of normal market 
rates. Ancillary services can be an important and relatively stable revenue 
stream for perpetrators. Charging for these services also has the effect 
not just of generating revenue but also of enabling perpetrators to create 
greater indebtedness (i.e. debt bondage) and hence vulnerability on the 
part of workers.
benefit theft: A second common strategy that forced labour operators 
use to generate revenue is benefit theft. In this situation, employers 
leverage their control over workers to force them to give up part or all 
of the work entitlements they claim (or more commonly that employers 
claim on their behalf) from the welfare system. Benefits may or may not 
be legitimately due to workers (i.e. they may be involved in fraudulent 
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claims) but either way workers see little of the proceeds since these are 
diverted by employers through coercion directly into their own pockets. 
Other forms of theft may also arise in forced labour situations as part of 
revenue generation, but to date these have not been documented in the 
three sectors considered in this Report.
These reductions in costs and increases in revenues also, of course, have 
to be considered in the context of a risk–reward calculation that any 
criminal enterprise has to make regarding the likelihood of detection and 
the potential consequences of that detection (Becker, 1968). As such, 
perpetrators ’rationally decide whether to engage in criminal activities by 
comparing the expected returns to crime with the returns to legitimate 
business. Hence crime is less attractive if government increases the 
probability (certainty) and severity of punishment’ (Garoupa, 2000).
Basic business models of forced labour
These two dimensions – the type of employer, and the way in which they 
make money from forced labour – help us understand the business of forced 
labour. Combined, they illustrate the four essential business models that can 
be found for forced labour in the UK (as shown in Figure 3).
These models have been primarily developed from our research focused 
on the sectors of commercial cannabis grow-ops, construction and food. 
However, we have sought to develop a framework that is as generalisable as 
possible to other sectors where forced labour has been documented in the 
UK. As such, we have reason to expect that it will be possible to incorporate 
practices in these other sectors into the framework.
It is also important to note that although we have discussed the two 
dimensions of the framework in Figure 3 in terms of two main forms 
(producer–intermediary, and cost minimisation–revenue generation), 
different business models and the employment relationships they describe 
are likely to exhibit different degrees along these dimensions. For instance, 
some employment relationships have greater degrees of intermediation than 
others, such as when multiple intermediaries are involved. Similarly, some 















figure 3: business models of forced labour
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involve only limited amounts. As such, these should be seen as continua, not 
discrete categories – and hence we have represented them as axes pointing 
outwards.
Model 1: Cost minimisation by producer
how it works: In this first model, producers are directly employing workers in 
their own operations and are seeking to reduce these costs of employment 
through coercion.
In labour intensive industries such as construction and farming, wages and 
other non-wage costs (such as benefits) paid to workers constitute a major 
driver of profitability for producers. That is, these variable costs represent a 
large proportion of total costs and so reducing them is the single best way 
to increase profitability. Therefore, firms may look to minimise direct labour 
costs through coercion in order to undercut competition and maximise 
profitability.
role of ancillary services: In this model, there is no attempt to charge for 
any ancillary services, so non-wage costs will usually be kept to a minimum, 
although ‘free’ accommodation may be offered as a lure to recruit the 
vulnerable, such as those who are homeless, fleeing the law, or recently 
arrived in the country (see Box 4).
Ancillary services may, however, be provided (for profit) by third parties 
such as agents or traffickers who are connected in some way to the producer 
through an existing network. These networks are sometimes based on 
national, ethnic or economic ties which link workers to service providers and 
producers. These third parties generate revenue from the ancillary services, 
box 4: homeless construction worker
Having become homeless, Michael, from Poland, was approached 
outside a tube station by a man who had his own building firm. “I was 
dressed in old and dirty clothes and I think he could see that I didn’t have 
anywhere to live,” said Michael. “He asked me if I was looking for work, 
and when I said yes, he offered me accommodation along with a job 
doing ground work and laying paving slabs. I was a bit suspicious at first 
and told him I didn’t want to go with him straight away, but I felt I didn’t 
have much choice as the other option was sleeping on the streets.”
Michael joined a number of foreign workers at the site where they slept 
in old caravans and a barn. “I felt like a slave,” recounted Michael:
The boss was very intimidating and did not like us going 
off the site on our own. He was always asking where I was 
going and what I was doing. I had no private life. If I wanted 
to go to the local shop, he would insist on driving me there 
and back. He was threatening and would say ‘I’ll kill you’ or 
‘I’ll beat you up’, half joking but in a frightening way. … One 
of the Irish guys he employed was mentally ill and another 
one was fleeing the law …. I felt like a virtual prisoner and 
wanted to escape from the situation but felt I couldn’t.
Source: Elliot and Lucio, 2011
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which in turn may fuel the supply of forced labourers (as the providers look 
to grow their business).
For instance, some informants suggested that traffickers (providing 
services such as transit and documentation) drive the supply of forced labour 
in the UK. In the GLA CEO Paul Broadbent’s words, “You can traffic a kilo of 
heroin only once. Trafficking people you can do countless times and there 
are entrepreneurs up at the top who are doing this” (presentation at the 
Association of Labour Providers Roadshow, London, March 2013).
where it works: We found examples of Model 1 in each of our three 
sectors. In cannabis production, this appears to be the dominant model for 
forced labour. In the construction industry, the model appears to be deployed 
most extensively at private residences in the ’tarmacking and block paving 
industries by crime groups comprising of UK travellers’ (Serious Organised 
Crime Agency, 2012: 7). In food, we found evidence of this model being used 
in small farming operations and in minority ethnic group restaurants.
Model 1 is particularly well illustrated by operators in the cannabis 
cultivation industry. This can be explained by a number of factors related to 
the nature of employment in illegal businesses:
illicit enterprises need to compensate workers for the greater risks 
faced in employment. In drug markets, this includes the risks of arrest 
and violence – for example, one study estimates that 50 per cent of the 
costs of hard drug businesses are accounted for by compensation to 
workers for risks of incarceration and physical harm (Caulkins and Reuter, 
1998). Although the market for cannabis (as a Class B drug in the UK) 
does not exhibit the same economic structure as hard drug markets 
(Class A), the risks of arrest and violence are considerable. For example, 
police raids uncovered some 7,000 cannabis farms in the UK in 2011–12 
(Summers, 2013), while the number of arrests of cannabis ‘gardeners’ 
in the UK between 2007 and 2010 rose by 128 per cent (Association 
of Chief Police Officers Report, 2012: 10). A forced labour arrangement 
enables employers in cannabis cultivation to avoid any additional 
compensation for such risks which would otherwise arise in a free market 
for labour into illicit enterprises. In this way, labour costs are minimised.
forced labour can also offer risk reduction benefits to employers 
in the cannabis cultivation industry and other illegal enterprises. By 
bringing in illegal workers to act as gardeners, high vulnerability will make 
workers unlikely to inform on their employers. Lack of documentation, 
absence of English skills, and an inability to form social networks (because 
they cannot leave the growing site) further contribute to a critical layer 
of opacity for the business which impedes detection and prosecution. For 
instance, in the case of R. v. N, the appellant, who did not speak English, 
was found to have been locked up in the cannabis farm with brick-
covered windows and doors, guarded by gun-carrying security guards. He 
was found to be unpaid and threatened to be killed upon attempting to 
escape once.
Model 2: Ancillary services by producer
how it works: As with Model 1, the worker in this model is directly employed 
by a producer, which may also reap the kinds of cost reductions discussed 
in relation to that model. However, the key difference here is that the 
producer also generates additional revenue from charges for ancillary 
services such as accommodation, food and transportation. Model 2 typically 
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enables employers to leverage their existing assets (perhaps a barn for 
accommodation or a van for transport) to drive additional revenue, especially 
where profitability from the main business is relatively low.
In forced labour contexts, these charges for ancillary services are typically 
involuntary and often hidden or only deducted at a later stage. This means 
that they need bear little or no relation to market rates, and rarely meet 
statutory quality standards. Sometimes up-front deductions may also be 
made, creating further indebtedness which can be leveraged to force extra 
labour time from workers. Overall, charging for ancillary services creates 
greater potential for opacity in the debts accrued by workers, which provides 
increased control for employers. In order to maximise returns on ancillary 
services, producers impose obstacles to workers leaving, such as threats, 
withholding of wages, or confiscation of documents, as the following case 
illustrates:
where it works: We found some evidence of this model in small-scale 
farming and construction. In farming, for instance, the prevailing economic 
logic in the UK is that small operations struggle to survive in the face of 
industry consolidation which creates larger and more powerful competitors 
that can reap economies of scale. Food processors and retailers are also 
mainly large players that can dictate prices down through the supply chain, 
which leaves farmers at the bottom tier of the supply chain with narrow 
margins. “If you are looking at what the bottom tier gets as a comparator 
to what the retail price is,” suggested Effie Marinos at audit firm SGS, “then 
you know, you are looking at probably less than 10%”. So typically, small 
box 5: latvian farm worker
Having been recruited to work on a farm, a Latvian farm worker found 
that his passport was confiscated by his employer. “Oh, they took my 
passport and after three weeks they did not return my passport. I went 
to ask for it,” he recounted. The farm worker then noted:
They always were coming up with good excuses. At the 
beginning, they said that they were completing the paperwork, 
that they will send it next week. Then they told me that they 
sent my passport, but I have to wait for a long time to get it 
back. I was trying to get my passport back for a year, but they 
would not return it to me. It was until they found out that 
someone was coming to inspect the farm. That same evening 
they returned passports to all of us … We had wanted to leave 
for some time, but we could not without our passports. We 
realised that it could not be like this, that we work hard and 
do not earn much. We could not go anywhere without our 
passports, but when they returned our passports three of us (me 
and two friends who I met on the farm) we run away from the 
farm. We owed farmer about £100 for the caravan and food. 
We did not want to work there, so we run away from the farm.
Source: Scott et al., 2012
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farmers will look to capitalise on their assets by expanding their portfolio of 
operations. This would normally (in a legitimate business) involve diversifying 
into value-adding processes, for example packing, tourism (such as opening 
a Bed and breakfast (B&B)) or retail (such as a farm shop or selling through 
farmers’ markets). However, forced labour operators will diversify into 
offering ancillary services to workers in order to generate additional revenue 
and drive greater indebtedness among the workers (which in turn can fuel 
further labour cost reductions).
Model 3: Cost minimisation by intermediary
how it works: Agents, agencies and other intermediaries generate revenue 
by charging producers (or other intermediaries) for their services. In the case 
of labour providers, this essentially involves charging the client a rate per 
employee that is greater than the rate paid to employees; this margin is the 
intermediary’s revenue. Thus, the price (P) for temporary labour (incurred by 
the client) can be represented by the following equation (Forde and Slater, 
2011):
Pt = Pw + Pnw + M
Where t is total cost to hirer, w is wage cost, nw is non-wage cost and M 
is the margin gained by the agency. For the agency, the aim therefore is 
to maximise Pt and to minimise Pw and Pnw in order to maximise M, the 
agency’s margin. Our research suggests that agencies actually have little 
control over Pt since this is typically dictated by the client. Therefore, the 
agency will reduce their non-wage costs by keeping their overheads low 
and driving down wages (Pw). This can lead to exploitation and even forced 
labour when the client dictates a client cost (Pt) close to or at minimum wage 
levels. As Effie Marinos notes, if in the main, workers are not being “paid the 
minimum wage, it is very frequently because the company itself is not paying 
sufficient to that agent”.
The tendency for clients to dictate rates near the national minimum wage 
is rooted in the fact that producers themselves are operating on narrow 
margins. As Darryl Dixon at the GLA noted, “the further down the supply 
chain you go, the lower the profit margins are. And therefore the way in 
which you can maximise your profits is by cutting corners.” Similarly, the 
retailers’ “relentless drive to push down prices of their products means the 
money has to come from somewhere,” suggested Martin Cooke of the 
Ethical Trading Initiative.
The pressure to go below the minimum wage leads to various responses 
from intermediaries which provide a fertile context for exploitation and may, 
in certain circumstances, give rise to forced labour:
• Some agencies seek to achieve labour cost minimisation by outsourcing 
to other agencies with lower labour costs (who may in turn outsource to 
other labour providers, including informal and independent operators).
• Another approach used by intermediaries is to offer clients alternative 
ways of reducing labour costs such as bogus self-employment schemes 
(where workers are officially designated as self-employed, but are 
effectively employed by payroll companies), which enable the bypassing of 
various controls regarding immigration and working conditions.
• Some agencies develop strategies to offset wage reductions involving 
ancillary services including ‘travel and subsistence’ and ‘salary sacrifice’ 
schemes which then involves a shift to Model 4 as discussed below.
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role of ancillary services: While the intermediary employing forced labour 
does not make deductions for ancillary services in Model 3, there are still 
non-wage costs associated with labour market intermediation (for example 
finding and selecting workers, organising documents, and transport) which 
need to be offset with fees to clients. Many clients are unwilling to cover 
these costs, as David Arkless of Manpower, a US-based, multinational firm, 
suggests:
So I put in my unit price for finding these people, … familiarising 
them, preparing them, getting their visa, transporting them, 
making sure they’ve got decent accommodation, and boarding 
them. And then making sure that, over the two-year assignment, 
they get treated correctly, then taking them back to their home 
country. So my cost would be $500 to provide you, Mr Customer, 
with that person. A local agent, between $50 and $100. Guess 
which bid the customer accepts? The agent that is operating 
illegally. They will not take my cost. It is five times higher than 
somebody else’s because I’m acting ethically.
The low-cost intermediary might also rely on further intermediaries (such as 
agents or traffickers) which they are connected with to supply some of these 
services. This will expand the typical ‘triangular’ employment relationship 
noted above (producer, worker, intermediary) to a more networked form 
of arrangement where several intermediaries may be simultaneously 
involved in worker exploitation (see Figure 4). In the words of Anti-Slavery 
International’s Joanna Ewart-James:
In recent history there have often been concerns raised about 
triangular relationships between the worker and the agency 
and employer, but I think that is getting increasingly more 
complicated and I am aware that there can be four, maybe five 
different actors involved in that relationship.
These types of network arrangements are particularly fertile contexts for 
worker exploitation because they diffuse responsibility and legal liability. 
As Ewart-James describes, “that added complication certainly facilitates 
exploitation because it is much harder to really understand in terms of the 
conditions that somebody’s employed and contracted under.” However, it is 
not clear whether this distributed responsibility arrangement is more or less 
likely to turn exploitation into forced labour. That is, forced labour typically 
requires a more direct employment relationship in order for high levels of 
explicit control to be exercised.
where it works: Our research suggests that intermediaries are associated 
with forced labour in both food and construction. Indeed, there is evidence 
to suggest that some of the same workers and intermediaries at times move 
between the food and construction industries in order to take advantage of 
particular opportunities that open up.
Although serious levels of exploitation can be found among a range of 
such intermediaries, forced labour typically emerges where an intermediary 
is operating at some level of informality, at least for some period of time. 
The more legitimate the intermediary, the less likelihood there is that they 
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engage directly in forced labour, suggesting that forced labour (at least in 
its strict sense) is more likely to be conducted by relatively small operators. 
However, that is not to say that larger and more formal intermediaries are 
not associated with forced labour since they may, for example, knowingly 
subcontract to an informal operator, or allow one of their workers to exert 
control over a subset of workers. This is illustrated in the following case.
It is important to note that the use of intermediaries, and agency workers 
in particular, is most commonly associated with large and medium sized client 
companies (Employment Markets Analysis and Research, 2008). Although 
the intermediary is likely to be relatively small, the worksite is more likely to 
be relatively large – and forced labour is only one part of the overall labour 





intermediary 2 intermediary 3
a) Triangular employment relationship
b) Networked employment relationship
figure 4: from a triangular to a networked employment relationship
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Model 4: Ancillary services by intermediary
how it works: In Model 4, rather than just earning a margin on the revenue 
earned from supplying labour to clients, the intermediary also generates 
revenue by providing services to the workers (see Box 7). Charges for such 
services are typically involuntary and/or tied to employment opportunities – 
that is to say, offers of work are contingent on paying for other services.
This dual income stream model may give rise to a paradoxical situation of 
forced labour through underemployment. That is, intermediaries may look to 
make more money from charging their employees for ancillary services than 
they do from their client fees, and so maximise the number of workers under 
their control but minimise the amount of work given to those workers.
Here is how this typically works: the intermediary deliberately takes on 
more workers than it needs for the work it expects to get from its clients. 
This oversupply leads to underemployment for the workers involved, 
perhaps only a few hours or one or two days a week. At the same time, the 
intermediary is charging these same workers for accommodation and other 
ancillary services, which they are not earning enough to pay for. So the 
workers get deeper into debt which in turn is financed by the intermediary 
through loans, often at super-premium (and frequently undisclosed) rates 
of interest. In this situation, workers are prevented from gaining financial 
independence from the intermediary and are open to continued exploitation, 
often coercive in nature. Therefore, unlike in Model 3, the intermediary 
is less concerned with maximising its margin charged to clients, and more 
concerned with maximising the number of workers under its control and 
maximising the margin earned from services supplied to its workers.
where this works: Our research found Model 4 being used in both food 
and construction, typically by intermediaries either involved in, or closely 
connected with, relocation of groups of immigrant workers from source 
countries. This enables the degree of control over the supply of workers 
necessary to make this business model work.
box 6: worker subverts control
Darius, a Lithuanian employee in a medium-sized British company, 
recruited other Lithuanians to work for the company and arranged 
their travel and accommodation. He was not doing so for free, however. 
Rather, the company discovered that Darius was charging the workers 
£50 a week to live in overcrowded accommodation as well as making 
additional deductions for unspecified reasons. Furthermore, “Darius 
would take each person to the bank, acting as a translator to enable 
them to open a bank account. He then took control of their bank 
cards and, each time their wages were paid into the account, withdrew 
them from a cash machine. He would then pay the worker a small 
amount and keep the rest of the wages.” The company was unaware of 
these dynamics. As Darryl Dixon of the GLA explained in an interview, 
“Sometimes … workers are being exploited, but they are being exploited 
by somebody who works for the same company that they do. … In 
that situation you find that it›s either, for example, Lithuanian workers 
exploited by a Lithuanian who works for the same company, or, for 
example, a Slovak Roma exploited by a Czech Roma who are in the same 
company.”
Source: The Centre for Social Justice, 2013; Dixon, interview, 2013
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dynamics of business models
It is important to recognise that there is not one ‘best’ business model for 
any given industry. They tend to be adopted according to the strategy of 
the organisation concerned, its resources and opportunities, as well as the 
prevailing ways of operating among their immediate peers. Business models 
tend to be somewhat ‘isomorphic’ in that organisations in a given field tend 
to copy each other, resulting in a degree of similarity over time.
That said, there are various dynamics built into the forced labour 
context (as outlined in Section 1) that are likely to result in organisations 
changing their business models. Most notably, the structures that give rise 
to vulnerability, such as immigration policy, are constantly shifting, giving 
rise to what we might term ‘dynamic vulnerabilities’. These in turn give rise 
to changes in business models, since individuals and organisations seek to 
adopt those models which most effectively take advantage of exploitable 
vulnerabilities.
A good example of these shifts is provided by the cannabis cultivation 
industry, where our research suggests that there may be a change occurring 
in the modus operandi of OCGs. Model 1 forced labour appeared to be the 
business model of choice for OCGs during the emergence and growth of 
Vietnamese gangs as principal players in the industry. However, now that 
these OCGs have become more established, the need for a compliant, 
opaque workforce has reduced somewhat in the face of greater collaboration 
box 7: making money from ancillary services
Thirty Lithuanian workers in Kent ’were subjected to slave-like 
conditions and controlled through the use of violence’ by D J Houghton 
Catching Services – a licensed gangmaster who supplied workers to 
Nobel Foods, one of the UK’s largest processors of eggs and chickens. 
The gangmaster charged workers excessive recruitment fees, deducted 
£40 a week from workers’ wages to live in a damp and infested house, 
charged workers high amounts for transportation from worksite to 
worksite, and sometimes stopped paying them entirely, forcing workers 
into a situation of debt bondage. ’The workers said they had been 
charged a fee of around £350 for what they had been promised back 
in Lithuania were good jobs. £50 a week was then deducted from their 
wages each week, so they were debt bonded on arrival. They allege 
they would be told to bring food to last five days and were then bussed 
around the country from job to job, from Monday to Friday, sometimes 
being driven for five or six hours at a time between farms before 
working a night shift.’
The GLA’s investigation found these ’workers suffered exploitation 
so extreme that the Authority had to order the firm to stop supplying 
workers to farms and food factories immediately’ and called the case 
’one of the worst cases of exploitation the GLA has ever uncovered 
in the food supply chain’. Nobel Foods supplies eggs to companies 
including McDonalds, Sainsbury’s, and Marks and Spencer.
D J Houghton Catching Services had their licence revoked by the GLA. 
They have appealed; their case will be heard in 2014.
Source: Lawrence, 2012; GLA, 2012.
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with other OCGs (and therefore less risk of violence and detection), and 
the efficiencies that can be gained in deploying a single free worker to tend 
multiple sites rather than trafficked forced workers in each individual site. 
As a result, some law enforcement personnel interviewed noted a lower 
incidence of forced labour as the business model evolves over time.
conclusion
Clearly there is no one way in which forced labour is operationalised as a 
business model in the UK. In this section we have set out the basic models 
in evidence in the UK. There is considerable diversity across these business 
models, and our framework identifies four main types. These involve different 
actors (producers v. intermediaries) exerting control over workers, and 
different ways of making money (reducing costs v. generating revenue) 
through the business of forced labour.
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3 supply chaiNs aNd 
forced labour
The business models discussed in the previous 
section focus on the perpetrators of forced labour. 
However, to understand the business dynamics 
at play, we also need to understand how these 
perpetrators are linked with other business actors 
through supply chains. This section therefore turns 
to the issue of supply chains, and in particular the 
intersection of the product supply chain with the 
labour supply chain.
product and labour supply chains
Understanding forced labour in the context of supply chains helps us do 
two things. First, it enables us to map the relationships between relevant 
economic actors. This is important because only through discovering these 
relationships can we develop interventions designed to identify or disrupt 
forced labour. Second, focusing on supply chains helps us to see where 
and how the formal business sector intersects with the informal sector, 
and eventually emerges as illegal forced labour practice. As we will show, 
informality is typically the gateway to forced labour. To do this, we set out in 
this section some generic product and supply chains, as well as some specific 
chains that can be identified in the cannabis cultivation, construction and 
food industries where forced labour has occurred.
Product supply chains
A product supply chain describes the discrete stages that a product goes 
through to transform it from raw materials to a finished product. Each of 
these stages comprises one or more activities that process the product and 
add value to the inputs received into that particular stage. This processed 
product then forms the inputs to another stage of production until the 
product reaches the final consumer. For example, a laptop moves through 
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several stages (and numerous companies) in its supply chain, consisting of 
raw materials extraction, component manufacturing, assembly, marketing, 
wholesaling and retailing.
It is now commonplace to frame analyses of forced labour in the context 
of such product supply chains. This is most evidently the case for global 
supply chains, and the incidence of forced labour in developing countries 
(Phillips and Sakamoto, 2012). Because each stage involves the deployment 
of labour, forced labour can, in principle, arise at any of the stages in the 
product supply chain. However, forced labour is usually associated with 
activities towards the beginning of these supply chains such as agriculture, 
fishing, mining, brickmaking, charcoal production and others. Thinking about 
forced labour in the context of supply chains enables us to consider the 
connection between these primary activities and the activities of companies 
and consumers further along the chain. For instance, forced labour in cocoa 
farms in the Ivory Coast can be conceptually linked to Western confectionary 
companies and their customers (Berlan, 2012).
Turning to the business of forced labour in the UK, it is similarly useful in 
most cases to describe the phenomenon in terms of the product supply 
chain, albeit often within the context of somewhat shorter chains. For 
instance, the connection between primary activities and end consumers was 
highlighted in the well-documented case of 60 forced labourers rescued 
from a Lincolnshire leek farm in 2008 which was claimed by activists to be 
farming products ’destined for our supermarket shelves’ (Anti-Slavery 
International, 2009). Previous JRF Reports have also pointed to the 
importance of supply chain dynamics in explaining forced labour in the UK 
food industry (Scott et al., 2012). A typical supply chain, such as that evident 
in the Lincolnshire leek farm episode, can be represented as shown in 
Figure 5.
Identifying the various stages in the product supply chain enables us to 
determine the producer companies that wittingly or otherwise are part of 
the business of forced labour. Our research suggests that the product supply 
chains relevant to forced labour in the UK are relatively short, with a few, 
relatively large, players involved.
For instance, the food industry is dominated by four large retailers, 
as noted earlier. The production, processing, and distribution of food 
commodities such as carrots, leeks, chickens, and eggs also typically involves 
only 3–4 large firms. As described by the British Retail Consortium,
contrary to popular belief, our supply chain is not dominated by 
small businesses and farmers. Our main suppliers are large, often 
multinational companies. Very few farmers supply supermarkets as 
their produce is processed by much larger companies, such as dairies, 
who sell to retailers
British Retail Consortium, 2012
A typical food product supply chain unfolds as follows: ’farmers generally 
supply intermediaries, such as processors and dairies, who then supply 
retailers and other parts of the food sector such as catering and 
manufacturing (British Retail Consortium, 2012).
Manufacturer WholesalerSupplier Retailer
figure 5: simple product supply chain
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These product supply chains are short compared with the global supply 
chains typically associated with forced labour in international business 
operations that have received the majority of media, business, non-
government organisation (NGO) and academic attention over the past 
decades. Hence, there should, in principle, be less of a problem with tracing 
the up- and down-stream actors involved in product chains using forced 
labour – at least compared with those involving global operations, and 
developing country labour.
It is also notable that, in contrast to the prevailing logic around forced 
labour, we do not find too much evidence of wide disparities in power 
between actors at different stages in the product supply chain in the UK, 
except when it comes to farmers at the bottom end of the food supply chain, 
who, because of their smaller size, tend to be squeezed on margins. However, 
the industrial structure of the cannabis growing and construction industries 
shows many fewer of these types of features, and even in food processing, a 
different dynamic is at play. In the UK, then, the product supply chain is rarely 
more than a small but significant part of the forced labour story, and we have 
to look elsewhere for the supply chain drivers of forced labour.
Subcontracting production activities
The product supply chain maps the firms that take custody of a product as 
it goes from extraction to consumption. However, to understand the real 
significance of these business dynamics we need to break these individual 
stages down into more discrete activities. That is, a particular stage in the 
supply chain (for instance, food processing) will consist of a variety of value 
creating activities, including operations, marketing, and procurement.
As we discussed briefly in Section 2, many firms have looked to outsource 
those activities within their own stage of production that they deem not to 
be core to their business, less important to the process of value creation, and 
crucially, which make less of a contribution to profitability. These low value-
adding activities are therefore typically contracted-out to other producers. 
In some industries, these contractors further subcontract the lower value-
adding activities of their businesses, and so on. This can give rise to a more 
complex product supply chain structure characterised by several levels of 
subcontracting, as depicted in Figure 6.
Our research suggests that forced labour in the UK is most likely to 
be associated with low value-adding activities at any given stage in the 
product supply chain. A number of informants pointed to the importance of 
distinguishing between different types of activity and the likelihood of forced 
labour and other forms of exploitation emerging at the more basic levels of 
activity, such as with cleaners in a food processing plant, dishwashers in a 





figure 6: illustrative subcontractor product supply chain
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For instance, in the case of the meat processing industry, slaughtermen 
and butchers are considered skilled workers and forced labour does not 
appear to be at issue. However, because a slaughterhouse may subcontract 
the lower value added processing of meat by-products (such as into sausages 
or pet food), the workers associated with these tasks often work “in the 
bowels of the building, often with the bowels of the cattle” as Martin Cooke 
from the Ethical Trading Initiative stated. Such workers are rarely included 
in social audit inspections. Similarly, cleaners responsible for disinfecting the 
slaughterhouse at night “always get exploited,” Cooke suggested, because 
“nobody is there to inspect them”.
Similarly, another informant described, reflecting on the business model 
of forced labour in farming, “we are talking here not about tractor drivers, 
we’re talking about seasonal labour for harvesting, or planting, so very, very 
labour intensive short periods of time in fields miles away from anywhere” 
(Rosey Hurst, Impactt Limited).
Reported incidents of forced labour appear to be concentrated among 
these low value added activities. For instance, from 2009 to 2010, 215 
trafficked children (aged 9–16) were found to be picking onions in a field in 
Worcestershire (Kleiderman, 2010). Similarly, in the case of R. v. Khan, Khan, 
Khan (2010), nine men working at a family owned restaurant – deceived 
by promises of attractive wages and working conditions in the UK – were 
subjected to conditions of neglect, abuse, deprivation and economic 
exploitation.
Low value-adding activities are more likely to be associated with forced 
labour for a number of reasons:
• Low value-adding activities generally require very low skills, which attracts 
a low-paid and frequently vulnerable workforce.
• Such activities are also more likely to be subcontracted, which means less 
oversight by the primary producer, and more scope for informality and 
unscrupulous behaviour.
• Low value-adding activities tend to happen ’backstage’, sometimes at 
night, and are generally less visible to observers, including other workers, 
managers and auditors.
Labour supply chains
It is much less commonplace to talk of labour supply chains compared with 
product supply chains, yet the concept of a supply chain is also applicable 
to labour where intermediaries are involved. A labour supply chain consists 
of the sequence of employment relationships that a worker goes through 
in order to be deployed in a productive capacity. These labour supply 
chains might be short, for instance in a direct employment relationship 
between a producer and a worker, where the worker has found the position 
independently. However, some chains become extended because labour 
market intermediaries are present. These intermediaries may either facilitate 
a direct worker–producer relationship (for example by helping the worker 
find employment) or substitute for a direct relationship by employing or 
controlling the worker directly.
In the context of the business models of forced labour, understanding 
the different stages involved in the supply of labour from its source to its 
final place of deployment is critical. To date researchers interested in labour 
exploitation have primarily couched these supply chains in the language of 
agency labour (and various synonyms such as ‘labour market intermediaries’, 
‘labour contractors’, and ‘contingent labour’) or human trafficking. Missing 
so far from these analyses has been a clear delineation of the different 
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intermediaries and stages involved and their intersections with each other 
and with the product supply chain.
Labour supply chains in the UK primarily involve formal, regulated 
intermediaries such as employment agencies and gangmasters. At times, they 
might also involve less formal intermediaries such as unregulated agencies 
or gangmasters or individuals operating outside any formal organisational 
context. These chains might also include actors outside of the UK involved in 
recruiting and transporting workers to the UK, either legally or illegally, and 
with varying degrees of volition on the part of the workers.
Industries such as construction and food use a considerable amount of 
temporary, casual and other forms of contingent labour, the supply of which 
is often outsourced to third party labour providers. These intermediaries may 
in turn also source some of the required labour from further intermediaries. 
This can stretch to several tiers in the supply chain, potentially even as many 
as five or six. According to our research, where forced labour arises in the 
context of intermediaries, the labour supply chain is likely to be relatively 
long and complex, and the forced labour component is likely to be several 
steps removed from the core labour force at the producer company.
For instance, Louise Grey, Sector Manager for Construction and Utilities 
at Achilles Group described that her company’s database suggests that 
most instances of forced labour within the construction sector’s supply 
chain occurs among subcontractors in Tiers 4 and 5. These tiers tend to 
be comprised of smaller producers and intermediaries facing high pressure 
to cut labour costs, as these can comprise high proportions of the costs 
of doing business. Neal Evans at Unite estimated that for some smaller 
intermediaries, labour comprised 100 per cent of their costs of doing 
business.
Similarly, within the food industry, informants suggested that forced 
labour often enters the labour supply chain in the face of multiple 
subcontracted labour agencies. This tends to occur when a time sensitive 
crop needs to be harvested, and intermediaries experience a sudden need for 
more workers. As Effie Marinos from SGS described, on a sunny day
the phones will have been buzzing back at the salad packers and 
the sandwich companies, saying you need to double production 
because people are going to be in, wanting more product. 
How are they going to do that? Well, they are going to do that 
by having everyone work extra hours and by bringing extra 
people in.
As she described, the extra people tend to come through multiple layers of 
informal and untraceable subcontracting, and may only be present on the 
work site for a matter of days or weeks, making it difficult for producers to 
detect abuses within labour supply chains. Martin Cooke, from the Ethical 
Trading Initiative, for his part, notes that factory owners “may seek to avoid 
responsibility for working hours and remuneration through the use of 
subcontracting and mechanisms such as the Swedish Derogation”.
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Formality and informality in supply chains
Forced labour in the UK is almost always associated with some degree of 
informality whether it is associated with producers or intermediaries, in 
product supply chains or labour supply chains. According to our research, 
informality is the gateway to forced labour. This is because informality 
enables the evasion of oversight and legal obligations that would otherwise 
prevent forced labour from occurring.
For the sake of clarity, in the supply chain figures that follow, we depict 
informality as a grey area, forced labour and other illegal practices as black 
areas, and formal, legal practices as white areas. We represent the product 
supply chain horizontally (e.g. P1–P4), and the labour supply chain vertically 
(e.g. L1–L4). To begin with, in Figures 7 and 8, we show some basic models 
of how product and labour supply chains intersect, and where formality, 
informality, and illegality might emerge in relation to forced labour. Figure 7 
reflects forced labour by a producer, while Figure 8 reflects forced labour 
by an intermediary. These figures are generalisations that provide a broad 
overview.
box 8: the swedish derogation
The term ‘Swedish Derogation’ originated with an opt-out clause gained 
by the Swedish delegation during the negotiations of the 2008 EU 
Directive on Temporary Agency Work.
A manifestation of the Swedish Derogation has been incorporated into 
UK law through an exception within the Agency Workers Regulations 
2010, that allows for a contract to be signed between a temporary work 
agency, as an intermediary, and an agency worker in which the worker 
forgoes his or her right to equal pay (including holiday pay) in return for 
pay during non-work periods.
Under the exception to the Regulations, after the 12 week qualifying 
period, the temporary work agencies have an obligation to pay workers 
between assignments and to ensure that reasonable steps are taken to 
find suitable work, though if this is not possible, that any available work 
be offered to the worker. The agency worker is to receive a minimum 
wage of no less than 50% of what would normally be the worker’s basic 
pay, as long as this is above the national minimum wage. When a worker 
is not on assignment, he or she is to be paid. That minimum pay must, 
in the aggregate, amount to four weeks’ pay before an agency worker 
functioning on the basis of the Swedish Derogation model may be 
terminated.
In December 2012, an employment tribunal in Bray and others v. 
Monarch Personnel Refuelling (UK) – related to a dispute involving tanker 
drivers who had been providing their services to BP, then forced to sign 
Swedish Derogation contracts – provided guidance on the application 
of this exception. The tribunal established that the Agency Workers 
Regulations must be followed to the letter while determining that 
such Swedish Derogation contracts may be superimposed on existing 
working relationships and need not be confined to contracts which 
might be established as a result of temporary work agencies having 
gained new clients.
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figure 7: simple labour and product supply chains with forced labour by 
producer
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supply chains in specific industries
We now turn to the product and labour supply chains that might give rise 
to forced labour in each of our three sectors. Our research suggests that 
there is considerable diversity in these chains, but that each industry does 
exemplify a typical profile which is in important respects distinct from that 
of the other industries, and from the more general models just provided in 
Figures 7 and 8.
Supply chains in cannabis cultivation
Because it deals with an illegal product, the cannabis cultivation industry 
involves a substantial number of illegal and informal actors in its supply 
chains. In Figure 9, we locate cannabis cultivation at P3 in the product supply 
chain. Feeding into this stage are various product inputs to cultivation (along 
the horizontal), including equipment (such as lights which are commercially 
produced and then sourced through informal suppliers), seeds, property 
(buildings where the grow-op is located which are typically rented legally 
from regular landlords), and energy (usually accessed illegally from the 
grid). Downstream from the producers are other actors in the product 
supply chain such as distributors, dealers, and ultimately users, who are all 
acting illegally. So this product supply chain consists of perfectly legitimate 
actors engaging in formal market transactions, as well as legal businesses 
conducting some informal transactions off the books, and criminal 
enterprises operating completely illegally.
The labour supply chains into cannabis cultivation (along the vertical) 
consist of a simple informal chain, for example, for the supervisor of the 
operation, who willingly joins the enterprise, as well as an illegal forced labour 
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figure 9: illustrative supply chains giving rise to forced labour in cannabis
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into the enterprise and keep them there through some form of coercion or 
debt-bondage (see Box 9).
An important point to note here is that although the cannabis cultivation 
sector operates in a zone of illegality where forced labour may be tolerated, 
there are also at some points in the product supply chain formal, economic 
actors who are either unaware of the practices further downstream or turn a 
blind eye to them. Probably the closest formal legal economic actors are the 
landlords leasing their property to the gangs.
Supply chains in food
The key factor to note in the supply chains of the food industry is the heavy 
reliance on labour market intermediaries in the incidence of forced labour. 
Although this is not always the case (for example, we have noted cases of 
farmers using forced labour without any involvement of intermediaries), it 
represents an important structural condition of the industry that we need to 
box 9: vietnamese gardeners and the cannabis supply chain
The cases of Khoi Dong Vu, Hoa Nguyen, and Tri Van Li, are just a few 
examples of the close to 400 Vietnamese people serving sentences in 
UK prisons. While each case varies slightly, there are broad similarities 
in how they ended up in the criminal justice system. They were all 
smuggled or trafficked into the UK from Vietnam through illegal 
channels, often by facilitators using forged documents and visas, and 
finding themselves indebted to their trafficker and being forced to work 
as gardeners in cannabis farms. Some report being paid minimally, while 
the majority report being forced into criminality by Organised Criminal 
Groups (OCGs), and locked up to look after the cannabis plants under 
the threat of violence to themselves or their families in Vietnam.
While OCGs who operate with the perception that commercial 
cannabis cultivation is a low-risk, highly profitable criminal business are 
responsible for organising the supply chain of Vietnamese gardeners, 
they also rely on a network of accomplices, including supervisors, 
renters, electricians, distributors, dealers, debt enforcers, and 
production/packaging workers. However, it is the gardeners who are 
typically the ones arrested and charged for drug offences while others in 
the supply chain remain largely undetected.
During the summer of 2013, major developments took place within the 
criminal justice system as the Court of Appeal for England and Wales 
squashed the convictions of two Vietnamese children on drugs charges, 
recognising that they had been trafficked into the UK to act as gardeners 
in a cannabis grow-op. The Lord Chief Justice in rendering judgement 
noted that those within the criminal justice system “must be alert to the 
potential difficulties to which cases involving victims of trafficking can 
give rise”. Previous to this case (L and Others (2013)), no person had been 
found guilty of trafficking in persons in the area of cannabis cultivation, 
and no gardener had been identified as a victim of trafficking.
Source: Scott, 2011; EUROPOL, 2012; Association of Chief Police 
Officers, 2010, 2012; Serious Organised Crime Agency, 2012; and 
L and Others, 2013
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take account of in showing how different types of supply chain arrangements 
can give rise to forced labour.
In Figure 10 we show an illustrative model of how an intermediary-based 
form of organisation might lead to forced labour in the food industry at the 
farming stage. That is, we show how successive stages of subcontracting of 
labour to supply workers to a farmer can breed informality (grey) which in 
turn can be the gateway to illegal forced labour (black).
These levels of intermediation are driven by seasonality in labour needs, 
the time sensitive nature of the industry, and the drive to lower costs by 
various actors in the product supply chain, for example among processors 
(P3) and retailers (P4). These factors lead to producers such as farmers 
relying on casual labour which is frequently supplied by intermediaries. 
However, either because the first tier of intermediary (L1) cannot provide 
enough labour or they want to leverage a lower cost provider at L2, 
subsequent tiers of intermediary are engaged. Pressure on costs then can 
lead to more informal intermediaries being introduced to the supply chain, 
usually on a temporary basis.
For instance, while farmers might maintain a stable supply of agency 
workers during the actual growing of a crop, as Martin Cooke of the Ethical 
Trading Initiative noted, “when it comes to harvesting, they certainly need a 


















Forced supply chain 
Product supply chainP1–P4
L1–L5 Labour supply chain
Formal product/labour ﬂows
Informal product/labour ﬂows
figure 10: illustrative supply chains with intermediaries giving rise to 
forced labour in the food industry
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the harvesting bit of the operation is known to be a problem”. Similarly, as 
Dionne Harrison of Impactt noted,
with seasonality, one week of the wrong weather in the wrong 
place and the whole season is wiped out. Or you have a burst of 
sunshine in the wrong week and then you have an abundance of 
fruit, but it all comes at the same time.
To prevent the crops from going to waste, producers request higher numbers 
of workers for a short period of time, which agencies procure through 
subcontracting.
Rosey Hurst of Impactt described how a first tier labour intermediary 
would initiate a supply chain:
you call someone, you say I want twenty people and that person 
maybe has five people at their disposal so he phones somebody 
else and he says, have you got some people and they go, yeah I 
have got three but I can get you another eight, so he phones his 
mate, so it is very, very informal, that is the way it classically works 
because it is a flexible thing.
She noted that while this was the industry norm before the creation of the 
GLA and licensing and that this is no longer the norm, some agents continue 
to operate in this way, primarily those who “view themselves as outside 
the regime or they may have a part of their operations that is licensed and 
another part that isn’t licensed”.
As our informants described, these dynamics have important implications 
for labour standards. In Impactt’s Dionne Harrison’s words,
So in terms of labour standards, that then has implications. You 
need all your workers, but you only need them for two weeks. 
You need to flog them to death for those two weeks, but then 
afterwards, there’s no work for them.
Similarly, Martin Cooke recounted,
We have heard about problems with chicken catchers. We have 
heard about problems with vegetable pickers and so on. Because 
once you have harvested a shed of chickens or a field of carrots 
and they are gone, then the workers are not going to be there 
for very long in that location. So you’ve got gangs of workers 
who are being moved, probably daily, to different locations 
around the country to do whatever the job is.
Supply chains in construction
Where construction typically deviates from the supply chain models 
discussed thus far is in the heavy use of subcontractors in the product supply 
chain in addition to intermediaries in the labour supply chain. This can make 
for a particularly complex set of supply chain relationships, such as those 
depicted in the illustrative example in Figure 11. Here, the construction firm 













































figure 11: illustrative supply chains with subcontractors plus intermediaries giving rise to forced labour in 
construction
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at P2 subcontracts various tasks to a series of smaller firms, all of whom 
might utilise labour market intermediaries (and so therefore have their own 
labour supply chains). At some stage, in some of these chains, informality 
may arise, and in turn could lead to forced labour.
One of the main structural drivers of these chains in construction is the 
high proportion of small firms in the industry, meaning that few companies 
have sufficient size to complete an entire set of tasks at any given stage in 
the product supply chain. Moreover, the high volatility of the construction 
industry creates a need for a flexible workforce, which is substantially 
resourced by intermediaries. What this means is that, as Figure 11 shows, 
the usual labour supply chain into a given stage in production is still in place 
(below the horizontal), but this is supplemented with additional layers of 
subcontracting and labour intermediaries (above the line) that bring a great 
deal of complexity into the picture. This is not to say that all forced labour 
in construction is characterised by this kind of structure. However, these 
arrangements, because they give rise to informality, opacity, and lack of 
oversight, provide a fertile context for forced labour to thrive (see Box 10).
Dynamics of supply chains
Many of the supply chains described above are rarely static, especially where 
they involve intermediaries and subcontractors. This is partly because such 
organisations are primarily involved in supply chains in the first place to 
deal with fluctuations in demand and to increase flexibility. Given that they 
are also used to reduce costs, the supply chains are also constantly open to 
reconfiguration as other opportunities to drive down costs arise.
The emergence of informality is also often a temporary phenomenon, 
driven by specific demands to fulfil particular labour needs under particular 
terms and conditions. The individuals and organisations that operate 
informally may also vary in their degree of permanence. That is, some 
veer into informality opportunistically to take advantage of a particular 
opportunity and then revert to a more formal arrangement, while others 
operate permanently in the informal sector, for example to avoid regulatory 
box 10: exploitation by construction subcontractors
In 2008, a major construction firm, Skanska, was operating a 
government Private Finance Initiative (PFI) hospital site in Mansfield 
worth £600 million. Skanska subcontracted most of the building work 
to its major subcontractors, including a firm called Baris, who sub-
contracted dry-lining to a small company called Produm. Produm was 
discovered to be paying its dozen Lithuanian workers just £8.80 a week 
for a forty-hour working week – a situation that came to light only 
after some workers stopped being paid altogether. According to the pay 
slips obtained by Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 
(UCATT), workers ’did not receive overtime (some workers worked in 
excess of 70 hours and took home less than £100) and were charged 
excessive deductions for rent, tools and utility bills. It is understood that 
many of these charges were unlawful’. The construction union UCATT, 
which uncovered the exploitation, described the case as an ’appalling 
systematic abuse of vulnerable workers’.
UCATT, 2008
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oversight, taxation, or immigration controls. Moreover, sometimes these 
are simply rogue individuals, while at other times they are organisations of 
several people, bound by a common identity.
It is therefore necessary to differentiate between permanent and 
temporary informal agents and organisations. A permanent informal agent 
is an actor in the supply chain – such as a labour market intermediary – 
who purposefully operates an informal business model on a long-term 
basis. A temporary informal agent is taken to be an opportunistic actor 
who temporarily or intermittently engages in informal activity. Similarly, a 
permanent informal organisation is an organisation or organisational unit that 
intentionally operates informally but comprises a significant and long-term 
part of the supply chain. A temporary informal organisation is taken to be an 
organisation that is opportunistically informal and may weave in and out of 
the supply chain.
For instance, returning to the example of the worker who subverted 
control and exploited his fellow employees in Box 6 (see page 36), ’Darius’ 
would be considered a temporary informal agent. When the opportunity 
presented itself, he informally recruited others to work for his employer, and 
arranged their travel and accommodation (as well as controlled and siphoned 
their wages). On the other hand, a permanent informal agent might be a 
person who picks up day-labourers on London street corners each day and 
provides them to various labour agencies in need of additional workers.
From chains to networks
In Section 2 we pointed to the shift from dyadic to triangular to networked 
employment relationships. This shift to a more networked arrangement is 
also relevant for how we conceive of the supply chains of forced labour. 
There are always certain limits to representing economic activity in terms 
of chains in that it can oversimplify what is actually a more complex set of 
arrangements. As Henderson et al. make plain in their 2002 publication:
A major weakness of the ‘chain’ approach is its conceptualization of 
production and distribution processes as being essentially vertical 
and linear. In fact, such processes are better conceptualized as being 
highly complex network structures in which there are intricate links – 
horizontal, diagonal, as well as vertical – forming multi-dimensional, 
multi-layered lattices of economic activity. For that reason, an 
explicitly relational, network-focused approach promises to offer a 
better understanding of production systems.
So far in this section, we have dealt with some of this complexity by 
representing chains in two dimensions (horizontal and vertical) as well 
as breaking down into subchains of subcontractors and intermediaries. 
Conceptualising these chains as part of larger networks, however, helps 
us to go one step further and consider the interrelationships between 
some of these actors. For example, an informal labour intermediary in the 
food industry may switch some of its workers to a subcontractor in the 
construction industry to avoid an audit, then leave them underemployed (but 
still paying for ancillary services) for a time, and then redeploy them with a 
different agency serving another food company at a later date.
Although the intermediary may be regarded as a permanent informal 
organisation, its role in any given chain is temporary and ambiguous. Seeing 
the organisation as part of a larger network of organisations within and 
across industries helps us capture the phenomenon of the business of forced 
labour at a greater level of complexity. Figure 12 provides one illustrative 
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example of how a networked arrangement of forced labour in food and 
construction might look.
conclusion
This section has set out the product and supply chains involved in forced 
labour in the UK. This has illustrated the way in which informality becomes 
the gateway to forced labour, or how in the words of Effie Marinos: if 
a person “cannot work legally, they are going to work on the black. As 
soon as they work on the black, they are in danger of being exposed to 
exploitation, which could include forced labour”. Nonetheless our analysis 
also demonstrates that formal, legitimate business is also always a part of the 
supply chains of forced labour, whether dealing in legal or illegal products. 

















Forced supply chain 
Product supply chainP1–P4




















figure 12: Networked model with forced labour across food and construction supply chains
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4 combatiNg the 
busiNess of forced 
labour
In this section we explore the ways in which the 
business of forced labour is currently tackled. We 
also assess some of the proposed alternatives that 
have been advanced by various stakeholders to 
enhance the means of combating forced labour. 
While our analysis is based on our study of the food 
and construction industries and cannabis cultivation, 
we believe that our study is relevant and applicable 
to other sectors of the economy.
existing approaches to combating forced labour
As awareness of exploitation in the workplace has grown, various systems 
have been developed to seek to combat forced labour. The three most 
prominent interventions designed to identify or disrupt forced labour within 
food, construction, and cannabis supply chains are regulatory enforcement, 
licensing of labour providers, and social auditing. These range from hard law 
interventions to self-regulatory systems designed and applied by business.
Given that forced labour is not easily positioned within a single space for 
regulation, each initiative should be seen as a piece of a jigsaw rather than 
a coordinated or comprehensive response. That said, our research suggests 
that a range of informants believe these current approaches to be limited in 
their effectiveness at preventing, detecting, and prosecuting forced labour.
regulatory enforcement
The criminalising of forced labour with the enactment of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 and the obligations which flow from the European Human 
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Rights Convention that ‘no one shall be required to perform forced or 
compulsory labour’ means that law enforcement agencies have a much wider 
remit to consider crime in the workplace. Yet, such enforcement – consider 
corporate manslaughter or fraud – remains very difficult, as contemporary 
law enforcement is geared towards crime in the public rather than in the 
private sphere, which has its own regulatory framework (Scheingold, 2011).
At or near the national minimum wage, policing around the workplace is 
about immigration status rather than forced labour. Although established as 
a standalone crime in 2009, forced labour is, in the main, dealt with by law 
enforcement within the regulatory framework related to trafficking, which 
has as one of its lead organisations, in terms of the formal identification of 
victims, the UK Border Agency. By falling under the umbrella of trafficking, 
labour exploitation tends to take a back seat to sexual exploitation, 
something which carries more resonance with the general public, is given 
more emphasis as a political priority, and is more conducive to policing.
However, even where the police are dealing with criminal activity, the case 
of cannabis grow-ops is instructive, as there have been difficulties in being 
box 11: challenges to policing forced labour
“… we are seeing more and more victims referred for labour exploitation. 
And we are seeing more and more support asked for by the police on 
labour trafficking cases.
I think from an operational perspective, one of the real challenges for 
any organisation investigating a labour trafficking case is the sheer 
volume of potential victims. So if you were to rescue a trafficked victim 
from a brothel, you may well end up with one or two, maybe a small 
handful, of victims. Which the police can deal with, they are accustomed 
to deal with. When you go and sort of raid a factory, a farm, a food 
processing factory or whatever it may be, you could end up with tens of 
people.
We did a job last year in Kent on a chicken farm, there were 
29 Lithuanian males. 29 people, potential victims, is … a real problem 
for the police to deal with. How do you deal with that? Because if 
you have got somebody in custody, you have only got 24 hours to 
deal with them. … So if you have got 29 people, that is 29 people to 
interview. They have to be interviewed in a certain way because they are 
vulnerable. They will probably need interpreters. They will not want to 
talk to you straight away because you need to build up some trust and 
rapport. And that is certainly not going to happen within 24 hours. … So 
there is a whole host of issues for the victims most certainly. You cannot 
bring them to a police station, that is not the way to deal with them, so 
where do you take 29 people? How do you feed 29 people, how do you 
look after 29 people?
And if you undertake a factory raid, how many police officers do you 
need for that? Dozens, a hundred? A lot. I mean, the raid on the site in 
Bedfordshire [where the Connors case transpired], the numbers went – 
it was a three figure number for police officers. And lots of planning, lots 
of support.”
Liam Vernon, UK Human Trafficking Centre
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able to make a distinction between gardeners as criminals and gardeners as 
victims of forced labour. As Klara Skrivankova of Anti-Slavery International 
has noted: “there is a huge priority to disruption and policing of drugs, and 
there is no priority in terms of policing targets and what police are evaluated 
and measured on in relation to forced labour and trafficking.” As a result, 
individuals locked into houses tending cannabis grow-ops find themselves 
within a criminal justice system geared towards identifying criminal behaviour 
rather than seeing a victim of exploitation.
Regulatory enforcement within the private sphere is in the main left to 
businesses themselves, facilitating rather than disrupting the ‘race to the 
bottom’ in which businesses attempt to lower cost and improve profitability. 
In this context, the use of intermediaries such as labour suppliers has blurred 
the line of responsibility between employer and employee, making it difficult 
to establish accountability where workers’ rights are violated, be they with 
regard to wages or health and safety. Where, in the UK, a business-friendly 
atmosphere pervades employment relations, regulatory enforcement is seen 
as being nearly nonexistent. It has been noted, with specific reference to the 
paying of the minimum wage, that there is ’still a feeling among employers 
at the rough end of the labour market that they could get away with non-
compliance’ (Low Pay Commission, 2013). Where regulation does exist in 
the area of business, it transpires through licensing, but also self-regulation 
through social audits.
Licensing
Licensing of labour intermediaries is an important way in which supply chains 
can be regulated to combat the business of forced labour. Such regulation 
of UK-based food supply chains commenced with the creation in 2005 of 
the GLA, which has played a critical role in improving the standards of labour 
providers. However, the restriction of licensing to the food sector, and the 
GLA’s ever decreasing resources, mean that licensing has had limited success 
in combating the business of forced labour.
As noted in Section 1, the licensing of labour intermediaries only operates 
in one sector, since the GLA’s remit is limited to agriculture, horticulture, 
forestry, fish processing, shellfish, dairy farming, and food packaging and 
processing.
The restriction of licensing to the food sector means that certain 
intermediaries have diversified to multiple industries. As Darryl Dixon of the 
GLA notes, some labour agencies “divisionalise so that there is a division 
that deals with providing workers into agriculture. They then mitigate and 
reduce their risk exposure in case we revoke their licence away.” If the GLA 
revokes an agency’s licence to operate within the food industry, workers 
can be moved into another industry, such as construction. Dixon considers 
that once an intermediary’s license is revoked, “the only way you can exploit 
those workers is by employing them somewhere where there is not actually 
an organisation that is looking at how the workers are treated”.
Non-GLA industries, such as construction, encourage the self-regulation 
of agencies, but there is no formal enforcement to secure compliance. 
As such, the UCATT has made plain that ’many workers encounter daily 
exploitation from agencies and gangmasters’ (UCATT, 2013). While the 
Agency Workers Regulations came into force on October 2011, ’giving 
agency workers the entitlement to the same basic employment and working 
conditions’ after 12 weeks on the job (BIS, 2011), the lack of licensing 
authority means that there is little accountability or enforcement. The 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ Employment Agencies 
Standards Inspectorate deals only with abuses that have already occurred. As 
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Sean Bamford of the Trade Union Congress noted, “unless it is covered by 
the GLA … there is no one really looking.”
The effectiveness of licensing has been further limited by the fact that 
the GLA is losing some of its resources. Funding to the GLA has fallen in 
recent years, and for 2012–13, ‘the Authority’s budget has been reduced by 
a further £200,000 to £4.1 million’. According to the GLA, this change ’sets 
the Authority a significant challenge to meet its objectives with reducing 
resources’ (GLA, 2012). Several informants described a “weakening of the 
GLA” over the past couple of years. As Joanna Ewart-James of Anti-Slavery 
International put it, “it has become increasingly difficult for GLA to fulfil its 
functions”.
Retail companies operating in the food sector have also voiced concern 
about the GLA ‘losing its teeth’. Sainsbury’s CEO Justin King has noted that 
retailers “should not be responsible for auditing supply chains”, suggesting 
that “we cannot perform the role of the GLA in policing labour abuses 
right through the entire supply chain and we are aware that without the 
intelligence received by the GLA a number of supply chain issues would go 
undiscovered” (Neville, 2013).
Social auditing
As labour and product supply chains have become increasingly fragmented, 
public and private sector organisations have developed tools and criteria 
to promote accountability among their suppliers. In particular, both public 
and private sector organisations have set out criteria including social and 
environmental standards upon which they award supply contracts. They have 
also developed protocols and tools to assess claims made around supplier 
performance in those areas.
Retail companies have dealt with the need to ensure social and 
environmental standards in their supply chains through a tool called social 
or ‘ethical’ auditing. Audits are a diagnostic tool that retail companies and 
other ‘lead firms’ use to measure, track, and enforce the standards and 
performance of producers and intermediaries in their supply chains. As 
the Supplier Ethical Data Exchange (Sedex) describes it, ’an ethical audit 
is a thorough formal examination of the labour practices of a particular 
workplace or company. It is a verifiable process to understand, measure, 
report on, and help improve an organisation’s social and environmental 
performance’ (Sedex, 2013).
Auditing is a widely used tool across many different industries, including 
those dealing with clothing, timber, and jewellery. The use of social audits is 
common practice in the food industry – where reputational risk is acute and 
brand is fundamental – for retailers such as Tesco and Marks & Spencer. It is 
also common among major construction companies, who rely on firms such 
as Achilles to ’identify, evaluate, and monitor suppliers’ (Achilles, 2013). Given 
the illegality of its product, the cannabis industry does not have a formal 
audit regime.
Our research suggests that the current social audit regime has limited 
success in detecting and, especially, reporting forced labour within the food 
and construction industries. The following are the three main reasons:
• Limited detection – the path of social audits is typically built around a 
product supply chain rather than a labour one.
• Limited reporting – in the UK, the audit regime has not been organised 
to encourage reporting of criminal activity.
• Limited corrective action – there is considerable variation in audit quality 
and corrective action.
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Limited detection
In the first instance, because the path of social audits is typically built around 
a product supply chain rather than a labour supply chain, social audits tend 
to exclude some of the most vulnerable workers within the supply chain. Two 
gaps are particularly significant in limiting the detection of forced labour.
First, because the number of tiers of subcontractors included in audits is 
not standardised, but rather is decided by the commissioning firm, many firms 
choose only to audit their largest subcontractors (Tiers 1 and 2). However, as 
the previous sections of this Report demonstrate, forced labour commonly 
enters the supply chain through smaller companies subcontracted for lower-
value activities (Tiers 4 and 5).
Second, the product-focused pathway of audits means social audits 
seldom pierce through the complex layers of intermediaries in the labour 
supply chain that often manifest forced labour. Audits are focused on 
producers’ core workforces, but as Section 3 of this Report demonstrated, 
forced labour commonly enters the product supply chain through long and 
complex labour supply chains, several steps removed from the workers 
officially on the books as the core workforce of producers.
For instance, as Figure 10 illustrates, forced labour often enters food 
industry supply chains through a complex labour supply chain of informal 
intermediaries (L3–5). Yet, the pathway of most food industry audits focuses 
on the formal supply chain (L1 and L2). Similarly, as Figure 11 illustrates, 
forced labour enters the construction supply chain after many layers of 
subcontracting (Sub 5), through informal intermediaries (L3–4). Yet, few 
audit programmes pierce through multiple levels of subcontracting or reach 
deep enough into the labour supply chain to detect forced labour. In brief, 
audit pathways are not currently built around the portions of the supply 
chain that are at the highest risk for forced labour. These zones – as our 
models illustrate – are where formality meets informality; in Figures 7 to 11, 
where the ‘grey’ turns to ‘black’.
Audits may therefore miss forced labour feeding in through these highly 
informal chains because they tend to be limited to the practices surrounding 
the workers documented on the records of producers (who are generally 
tasked with verifying the workforces of their intermediaries). As Impactt 
Director Rosey Hurst has noted, this can make it difficult to detect forced 
labour since “there could always be another group of people” who were not 
on the books. While auditors occasionally encounter such workers during 
site visits, our informants noted that producers commonly rid their worksites 
of exploited workers for the duration of the inspection. As Effie Marinos of 
audit firm SGS relates,
It used to be the standing joke that if you went to Alton Park, 
which is one of our amusement parks, on any week day, what you 
did find is loads of illegal workers who had been given the day off 
by their employers, and all the difficult ones who were likely to 
say things to the auditors.
Furthermore, because social audits are set up around product supply chains 
that feed into branded retail stores, they tend not to cover the portions 
of industries that do not flow into retail supply chains. Within the food 
industry, for instance, audits tend to exclude farms that are outside of major 
supermarkets’ supply chains. As Marinos described,
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not all the farms are involved in the supply chains to the 
supermarkets and if you are going into the cash and carries, if you 
are going into the markets, if you are going to those places, I am 
not aware of anybody who is checking.
This has particularly serious implications for industries such as construction 
that are primarily structured around a business-to-business market, and 
illegal industries such as cannabis production which have no legitimate, 
downstream retail stage.
Limited reporting
The audit regime has also not been organised to encourage reporting of 
criminal activity. As private firms contracted by businesses – not government, 
or the public – to examine and verify the supply chain, audit firms are obliged 
to report forced labour and similar abuses to their clients, but not externally.
As our informants described, audit reports are generally confidential 
to the firm that commissioned the audit. A copy is sometimes sent to the 
supplier along with the ‘corrective action’ plan devised by the client. But 
because audit firms are businesses whose primary obligations are to their 
clients and not to the public interest, their ability to report exploitation and 
forced labour is limited. As Marinos described,
box 12: forced labour in a food warehouse
“ … I think the worst case we ever came across, without naming names, 
was actually in a distribution warehouse. A group of Romanian women, 
in their forties were intentionally recruited because they couldn’t speak 
very good English. This meant that they did not have the means or 
power to ask questions or get help.
They were made to think that they were illegal. So, forced to register 
under a false name, passports taken away, and had to pay various 
monies. They were brought over in a bus and they had to pay that 
person. They then had to pay to get the job and accommodation 
deposits so by the time they started working, they were heavily in 
debt. The accommodation provided was more expensive than the local 
market warranted and the quality very poor; even unhygienic in some 
cases. Charges were certainly much more than legally allowed when 
accommodation provided by an employer.
A fellow worker acted as a middleman with one of the local agency 
representatives to ensure all the women’s wages were paid into the 
bank account of the middleman and he then distributed minimal monies 
to them. He claimed many deductions from their wages so they never 
received enough money to cover their debts or save money. So in 
effect they were debt bonded to this middleman in collusion with a sole 
individual from the agency. That’s probably the worst case I’ve personally 
come across.”
Dionne Harrison, Impactt
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We would have to work with the commissioning company on that 
to decide how they wanted to play it because, it is not – it is one 
of those strange situations, that unless you have real evidence 
that the law is being broken, you really cannot start going to the 
authorities, not if you want to stay in business, anyway.
The GLA is in the process of revising its 2010 ’Supermarkets and Suppliers 
Protocol’ to encourage and create channels for auditors to report forced 
labour among labour agencies directly to the GLA. In Darryl Dixon’s words, 
the Protocol will “raise the awareness of ethical auditors, and make sure that 
where they identify problems, those problems are notified to us”. However, 
outside the food sector there appear to be very few established channels to 
facilitate reporting between audit firms and government authorities.
Limited corrective action
Although there are numerous examples of best practices and shared 
standards in the ethical audit industry, not all firms deliver uniform high 
quality audits. Auditors vary in the depth, methods, and rigour they use. Our 
informants noted that the recent rush of audit activity over the past decade 
has resulted in a high number of “very poor quality audits, which are not 
heuristic in nature.” As Rosey Hurst of Impactt described it, many auditors 
are “not trying to find things out, they are trying to prove that something 
is not there.” In the words of Aidan McQuade of Anti-Slavery International, 
“you have an industry of ethical auditors out there now who will find nothing 
if you pay them to go and find nothing”.
Considerable variation is also evident in how commissioning firms decide 
to deal with labour non-compliance issues documented through audits. As 
Marinos described,
What the audit will do is present you, the factory or the farm, 
or whoever, plus your principal if they are the ones who have 
commissioned the audit, with this is what is happening. It is then 
up to those people to look at how they are going to address and 
deal with those issues.
While some firms may work with suppliers to improve their practices through 
strategic partnership models and corrective action plans, others leave it up to 
subcontractors to make and self-report on their improvements, sometimes 
with limited success. As Marinos noted, “it does not matter how many times 
we audit a factory, that does not mean they are going to improve.” Other 
firms may simply dump the supplier if forced labour or exploitation are found, 
but, as Martin Cooke of the Ethical Trading Initiative noted, “they cannot fix it 
if they suddenly just say, “Right, that is it. We are dumping the supplier.” The 
supplier will just find somebody else to sell the stuff to and the problem will 
continue.” Still other firms , in McQuade’s words, simply ask auditors to make 
the problems discovered “go away” and if they “can’t make that go away then 
why would they ever hire that auditor again. So it’s a corruptible thing”.
A key factor in a firm’s ability to act upon audit results is size. As Cooke 
stated:
I think it is easier for the big retailers because they have a lot of 
leverage over their suppliers and their business is very valuable to 
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people. It is much more difficult for the smaller companies where 
they may only account for a very small percentage of a particular 
supplier’s output. So their ability to leverage change is much less. 
Their ability to detect problems is less. Everything gets more 
difficult if you are small.
Given these limitations on detection, reporting, and corrective action, it is 
perhaps not surprising that there have been numerous incidents in recent 
years where forced labour has been found amidst businesses that have 
successfully passed social audits. In one such case, a human trafficking raid in 
Lincolnshire found 60 migrants subjected to forced labour harvesting leeks 
by a firm called A14 Vehicle Hire, which supplied labour to Emmett UK. A14 
had recently passed two successful audits by Emmett, as well as an audit by 
the GLA in 2008. All of these audits failed to detect the abuse (Shankleman, 
2008; Ewart-James, 2009).
proposals to better combat the business of forced labour
During the course of our research, we noted a range of proposals that 
have been put forward to deal with the problem of forced labour. These 
proposals range from those focused on a specific element of the regulatory 
framework (such as licensing) to overhauls of the framework itself (such as 
an Anti-Slavery Commission). Each of these proposals has its strengths and 
weaknesses, as described in Table 4.
table 4: current proposals to address forced labour in the uk
proposal Approach strengths Weaknesses
1. Expand remit 





regulation of labour 
providers to sectors 
outside of food industry
• More licensed labour 
providers operating in the 
UK market
• Extension of state 
oversight over travel and 
subsistence schemes 
• GLA does not regulate labour provision, per se; it 
only licenses and revokes licence
2. Deepen the 
powers of GLA 
within the food 
sector
Strengthen the GLA’s 
ability to track and treat 
forced labour when 
they come across it
• Gives GLA power to 
investigate forced labour 
and apply criminal codes
• GLA’s remit would remain confined to 
companies with at least one operation in the 
food sector
• Only 55% of GLA licensed businesses also 
operate in other sectors
3. Transparency 




Require companies with 
over £100 million in 
gross annual receipts 
to disclose their efforts 
to eradicate slavery, 
trafficking, and forced 
labour from their supply 
chains
• Increased transparency 
among the largest 
companies
• Increased public and 
corporate awareness of 
forced labour
• Deepens reliance on audits as regulatory 
mechanism
• Companies are not bound to specified, 
independently established guidelines. Rather, 
they simply report what they are doing to meet 
internal goals.
• Does not increase ‘boots on the ground’




Creation of a new 
commissioner to focus 
and coordinate efforts 
against slavery
• Harmonisation of 




• Would focus mainly on ‘giving voice’ to victims 
of modern slavery rather than specific action
• Likely to concentrate primarily on highly visible 
and public issues
• Could be susceptible to political interference, 
e.g. around immigration policy
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conclusion
In the light of our findings in the previous sections, we would suggest that 
each proposal has merit, and may go some way to enhancing the way that 
forced labour is combated in the UK. However, it is also clear that they do not 
address in any fundamental way the underlying business models of forced 
labour set out in this Report. Closer attention to disrupting the business of 
forced labour is necessary. Moreover, although the proposals demonstrate 
that there is active attention to dealing with the problem of forced labour 
in the UK, there is a lack of a unified voice and platform for advancing this 
agenda. As recent JRF Reports have noted (see, for example, Geddes et al., 
2013), a new way forward needs to be developed.
In this Section we have explored some of the principal ways in which 
forced labour is combated in the business arena in the UK, and briefly 
examined a number of proposals for enhancing the current regime. We have 
shown that while the current set of initiatives help to reduce exploitation, 
and have some effect against forced labour, more concerted attention is 
needed. Going forward, new approaches will have value, but will need to be 





Having considered the business of forced labour, it is 
clear that money is made in such situations through 
either cost minimisation or revenue generation. 
The minimisation of costs may transpire through 
reducing the amount of remuneration given to 
workers in a manner that would not otherwise be 
possible if coercion or deception were not being 
utilised. When speaking of the minimising of costs 
we also include the minimising of risk which may be 
at play when dealing with illegal activity. By coercing 
a person, the victim may be less likely to reveal their 
situation, thus reducing the cost of detection while 
maintaining low labour costs.
Revenue generation is often used either as a substitute for or in addition 
to cost minimisation, in the business of forced labour. Revenue generation 
results from the charging of exploited workers for the provision of services 
such as accommodation, food, and transportation. A second revenue stream 
which makes the business of forced labour profitable is the theft of benefits 
from workers. Welfare entitlements which should otherwise go to the 
worker, are taken as a means of profiting from exploited workers.
Our consideration of the modus operandi of forced labour shows that 
the approach to the business of forced labour can be further understood 
by making a distinction between the producer and intermediaries as the 
beneficiary of forced labour. The producer, the person actually deploying the 
forced worker in a productive capacity is, in the main, found in high intensity, 
poorly mechanised sectors of the economy, which require low-skilled 
workers labouring at or near the national minimum wage. Producers using 
forced labour are typically small enterprises that operate in the informal or 
illegal sectors.
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Intermediaries are go-betweens who provide labour-related services. 
Such labour providers, be they gangmasters or payroll agencies, provide 
flexibility and are used to reduce costs for producers. Forced labour will often 
enter the labour supply chain through intermediaries where the industry is 
volatile or work is time sensitive.
Indeed, reference to labour supply chains is fundamental to understanding 
the context in which forced labour can enter and be sustained within a sector 
or business. It is at the confluence of production and labour supply chains 
that the business of forced labour can best be understood.
While it is often considered that forced labour is hidden, our research 
demonstrates that it links through supply or labour chains to the formal 
economy. Product supply chains in the UK are relatively short, however 
labour supply chains have a greater propensity to become complex, which 
then allows for informality: the gateway to forced labour. The complexity 
of labour supply chains is most evident in time sensitive situations such as 
those relating to agricultural harvest or looming construction deadlines. 
While informality often results from a lack of enforcement of employment 
standards, the recognition that complex labour supply chains are prone 
to include exploitative practices including forced labour should focus our 
thoughts on possible solutions.
To that end, it should be recognised that the current social audit system 
meant to monitor labour supply chains has had limited success in detecting 
and especially reporting forced labour. In fact, despite a general obligation on 
all UK citizens to report any criminal activities, social auditors are, in the main, 
often precluded from reporting possible cases of exploitative practices to 
regulators or the police by confidentiality agreements.
The issues of social audit confidentiality agreements and the criminal 
law is symptomatic of a UK regulatory framework which has, as yet, failed 
to internalise the fact that the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 criminalises 
forced labour. The Act itself and the positive obligations to which the UK is 
bound by reference to the European Human Rights Convention require a 
robust approach to tackling the type of exploitation which leads to forced 
labour in the area of employment at the ‘rough end’ of the economy.
The European Court of Human Rights has noted that States, including 
the UK, are required ’to put in place adequate measures to regulating 
businesses often used as a cover for human trafficking’. The Court states that 
furthermore, ’a State’s immigration rules must address relevant concerns 
relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking’ (Rantsev 
v Cyprus and Russia, 2010). For the European Court, there is no distinction 
to be drawn between the process by which one is brought into a situation 
of exploitation (trafficking) and the actual exploitation (be it forced labour or 
other types of exploitation); as a result the obligations regarding regulating 
business and immigration hold for issues of forced labour. The same goes 
for the regulation of intermediaries beyond the remit of the GLA, such that 
labour inspection is seen to enforce elements of the regulatory system which 
allow work to fall into informality. Thus, issues of wages, hours worked, health 
and safety and general work conditions need to be monitored in those areas 
most prone to exploitation.
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights further 
stipulate that beyond the state’s obligation to protect such human rights, 
business enterprises have a ’responsibility to respect’ which requires them 
to ’prevent, mitigate and, where appropriate, remedy human rights abuses 
that they cause or contribute to’ (United Nations Human Rights Office of 
the High Commissioner, 2011). Thus, businesses have a duty not only to 
implement commitments and policies related to forced labour, but also to 
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undertake reasonable due diligence of their potential impacts (including 
through their suppliers and business partners) and put in place processes for 
remediation for victims.
recommendations
The following recommendations, while being developed with special 
emphasis on three sectors (cannabis cultivation, construction and food), are 
applicable more generally to the overall approach which the UK should take 
towards ending the business of forced labour.
These recommendations should be considered in the light of the legal 
obligation of the UK to put in place adequate measures to regulate sectors of 
the economy where exploitation and forced labour are or may be present.
While we recognise that our recommendations encompass possible 
trade-offs and challenge freedoms normally associated with ‘doing business’, 
we seek to emphasise those values which inform the prohibition against 
forced labour and see these as creating a better UK society.
With this in mind, we recommend the following:
1 a multi-stakeholder action plan (msap) be developed, taking into 
consideration the following recommendations to address issues of 
forced labour from an overarching perspective. This MSAP should be 
developed by a group of representatives from the various stakeholders 
involved in the business of forced labour and take into consideration 
government regulation and enforcement, initiatives from the business 
community, and input from trade unions and civil society. One or more of 
these actors, ideally from the public sector, would need to take a lead in 
forming the group responsible for developing the MSAP.
2 a uk-wide advisory panel be put in place to better coordinate 
activities among those seeking to combat forced labour and to 
implement the MSAP. There is a need to build cohesion among different 
stakeholders while establishing leadership which is committed to the 
prospect of removing forced labour and exploitation as a structural 
element of the UK economy.
3 regulators, law enforcement, business and civil society organisations 
should aim to disrupt the business of forced labour by carefully 
targeted interventions in the formal and informal economy. 
Interventions should recognise that forced labour is not hidden, and 
that somewhere along the supply chain informality intersects with the 
formal economy. Particular attention should therefore be paid to effective 
disruptions in the formal economy, for example by prosecuting landlords 
leasing properties to cannabis gangs using forced labour, exposing 
property developers benefiting from the forced labour of construction 
gangs, and imposing subcontracting rules and restrictions on labour 
providers.
4 government should take a lead in ensuring that forced labour 
is regulated out of the uk market, while leading the way through 
its procurement policies in demonstrating a commitment to ending 
workplace exploitation. That the Government put in place the legislation 
and support the mechanisms in place which can eliminate the structural 
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elements of the UK economy which allow for forced labour and labour 
exploitation.
5 the cost of recruiting vulnerable people into forced labour be 
sufficiently increased to price extreme exploitation out of the 
market. To undermine the business models of forced labour the costs 
of finding and exploiting vulnerable workers need to be increased. This 
might, for example, be achieved by regulators (through changing tax and 
immigration rules) to ensure all workers in the UK are subject to minimum 
wage rules regardless of nationality. The Government should also shift 
some responsibility (and concomitant resources) to community actors 
to provide support for those at risk and ensure that they are not easily 
targeted by forced labour recruiters. Local businesses and law enforcers 
should make moves to remove the informal recruitment grounds that 
effectively allow recruiters to operate quasi slave markets on the high 
streets of the UK.
6 the cost of work force flexibility be borne by the producers (such as 
farmers, factory owners, and construction companies) that ultimately 
make use of flexible labour. A flexible workforce has significant value 
for producer companies but it also comes at a cost. Many companies, 
however, simply take the benefits and do not reimburse labour providers 
or their workers for the costs involved. Rates paid to labour providers 
by companies should be accompanied by an accurate account of the 
costs within the formal economy of recruiting and retaining a flexible 
workforce. Industry associations representing labour providers should be 
supported in seeking to ensure that producers establish better rules of 
engagement.
7 intermediaries be held accountable for the introduction of 
subcontracted labour into supply chains where the costs of flexibility 
have been borne by producers. Companies need to set in place 
procedures to impose contractual liability and moral accountability 
on the Tier 1 labour providers they deal with directly for any labour 
subcontracted (or sub-subcontracted) by the provider. This should 
include appropriate awareness raising and training of labour providers by 
companies, as well as incentives for compliance.
8 all labour providers involved in the supply of labour at or near the 
national minimum wage should be regulated through licensing. The 
mandate of a GLA-like regulator should thus be extended to other 
industries at risk, starting with construction.
9 regulatory oversight over audit firms be established, and the 
establishment of a professional body to accord them standards, and 
develop a widely accepted, publicly available professional code. This 
code should include provisions for the enforcement of forced labour 
regulations and would require social audit firms to report incidents of 
suspected exploitation or criminality to the appropriate authorities.
10 social audit firms be required to share data on the incidence of 
suspected exploitation or criminality (for example through Sedex) 
with other interested parties including other auditors, their clients, and 
the police. A watchlist of high risk producers (such as farms, factories or 
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construction companies) and labour market intermediaries (agencies and 
individuals) should be established.
11 recognition by law enforcement agencies and prosecutors that in 
cases of cannabis grow-ops, gardeners may be in situations of forced 
labour and thus should be treated in the first instance as victims.
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This Report draws on a combination of primary and secondary data. 
Data collection involved two phases: (1) secondary data collection, which 
encompassed an extensive desk-based literature review of forced labour 
in the UK, with a particular focus on the food and construction industries 
as well as cannabis cultivation; (2) primary data collection, which involved 
conducting qualitative semi-structured or unstructured interviews with 
participants which included key informants in the field.
During the desk-based literature review, a total number of 62 court 
documents and appeals cases, 35 newspaper articles, 42 academic studies 
and 63 reports were reviewed. For the primary data collection phase of the 
project, a total of 27 in-person interviews and 5 phone interviews were 
conducted. Interviews were conducted with experts on forced labour, trade 
unionists, law enforcement agents, non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
representatives, academics, researchers, barristers, employer representatives, 
company CEOs and ethical auditors.
The interviews were then transcribed and analysed using three levels of 
coding: (i) initial coding, where abstract concepts and themes that emerged 
from the interviews were linked with themes that were consistent with our 
line of inquiry, and which informed the secondary data which was collected 
during phase one of the data collection period; (ii) categorical coding, where 
coding from the abstract level was refined and examined using specific focal 
points, key terms, concepts and nodes, using NVivo10 software; (iii) thematic 
coding, where emerging themes were identified from the refined data 
(e.g. the impact of intermediaries in the labour supply chain, and the role of 
coercion in forced labour in cannabis grow-ops.).
Subsequently, a round-table discussion was convened in April 2013 
during which discussions and consultation took place with experts and 
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